

Rhetoric and Dualism in Economics

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Abstract:

This paper attempts to combine elements of the approaches of two influential economists, Sheila Dow and Deirdre McCloskey and expands on previous work (2005) on Dow's concept of dualism. A concept of rhetorical dualism is developed: dualism (defined variously) engaged in for a rhetorical purpose. It is argued by way of example case studies that rhetorical dualism is a significant feature of economics and that several influential authors have engaged in it. Further rhetorical dualism is shown to be prevalent in the current orthodox/heterodox distinction, and in the arguments of heterodox economists; but that this distinction and type of distinction are unhelpful.

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Rhetoric and dualism in economics¹

1. Introduction

Many of the recent developments in economics have concerned pluralism. This has occurred at various levels and involved numerous groups. At one level, philosophers of economics have laboured over what pluralism is (Mäki, 1997; Dow, 1997; Salanti and Screpanti, 1997; Caldwell, 1982). This work has generated a plurality of definitions of pluralism; this may or may not be a helpful development. On another level, work on theory, method and empirics, so-called orthodox economists have claimed that they are – and in some cases they have been – becoming more pluralistic (see Colander, 2000). Of course, so-called heterodox economists have argued that in fact the orthodoxy has become more entrenched in its positions and has even acted to reduce pluralism (Lee and Harley, 1998). Such claims by the minority position are not new; indeed, a consistent claim by heterodoxers has been that good ‘heterodox’ principles, such as the importance of time, history, uncertainty and agency, have been appropriated and neutered by orthodox economists (the debate over the *real Keynes* providing perhaps the best examples of such claims). In addition to such debates between orthodox and heterodox, there have also emerged views that the orthodox/heterodox distinction is unhelpful (e.g. Garnett, 2005; Sent, 2003; Davis, 2003; Dow 2000).

This paper will return to that last question towards its conclusion. For now, I should like to claim that the debates above could be viewed as being, in part, about how economists think and argue. This opinion is based partly on the observation that simultaneous with the debates above, two literatures have developed which help us understand the way economists think and argue, and therefore help us explain the debates over pluralism. One is the work developed by Sheila Dow on the prevalent tendency in thought towards dualism (Dow, 1990, 1995, 1997, 2002, 2004, 2005; Chick and Dow, 2001, 2002; see also Mearman, 2005). Dow points out the pitfalls of thinking in fixed ‘either/or’ categories. Significantly, she has argued for pluralism, but for one of a specific type, which is structured and allows room for schools of thought to persist. The second body of work is that, associated primarily with Deirdre McCloskey, on the rhetoric of economics (see McCloskey, 1983, 1985, 1994, 1998; Ziliak and McCloskey, 2004). That literature cautions economists to be more aware of how they converse and the language they use. The rhetoric literature has been accompanied by a focus on the language of economics (see for example, Henderson, Dudley-Evans and Backhouse, 1993).

This paper aims to perform a type of synthesis of these literatures into a concept of rhetorical dualism. Rhetorical dualism is: the creation of dualistic categories for a rhetorical purpose. The concept as developed here is a combination of Dow's concept of dualism and McCloskey's concept of rhetoric. The paper argues, by way of (hopefully persuasive) examples, that rhetorical dualism is common in economics. We follow others in examining prominent debates in economics. Backhouse (1993) and Dudley-Evans (1993) analyse the language used in the debate over the quantity theory of money

¹ This work was partly completed at the University of Amsterdam, where I was a visiting research fellow in March 2006. I acknowledge their assistance.


between Friedman and his critics. Thus, we consider work by Mishan, and the debate between Monetarists and Keynesians as outlined in Johnson (1971). We then examine Critical Realism and even McCloskey herself. The paper argues that in each case, rhetorical dualism is a) present and b) problematic. It can be shown that even when authors accuse others of rhetorical dualism, often they are practising it themselves. It then examines the contemporary question of the orthodoxy/heterodoxy distinction. That distinction is shown to be problematic in some ways; and that perhaps it should be abandoned.

2. Dualism and rhetoric

2.1 Dualism

Elsewhere, Mearman (2005) has developed Dow's (1990) work on dualism. For Dow, dualism is "...the [1] propensity to classify [2] concepts, statements and events according to duals, as [3] belonging to only one of [4] two [5] all-encompassing, [6] mutually-exclusive categories with [7] fixed meanings: true or false, logical or illogical, positive or normative, fact or opinion, and so on" (Dow, 1985: 14; 1996: 16-17). Based on an analysis of Dow's work, Mearman argues that in fact, dualism as originally defined (dualism₁) is extremely rare and practically irrelevant. Rather, Mearman argued that Dow's concept of dualism applies best to a situation, which he terms dualism₂, in which there are polar concepts, or in which a continuum of concepts can be found. This can be illustrated by Figure 1 below.

Figure 1: DUALISM₂



In both cases, a (solid) line connecting all the points between the end points X and Y can be imagined. Mearman argues that the act of dualism to which Dow refers (dualism₂) involves the imposition of a fault line at some point on the line (at Z) between the end points. Thence, all points to the left of this fault line are treated as equivalent to the left pole (i.e. all points to the left of Z are treated as X); all points to the right are treated as equivalent to the right pole (all points right of Z are treated as Y). Thus, if "rational" and "irrational" were two polar extremes, the act of dualism would be to impose some point, to the left of which all behaviour would be considered completely rational and to the right of which, completely irrational. There would be no possibility of bounded rationality, for example.


Dow argues that such dualistic thought can be damaging for economics. This is particularly so when the categories get fixed and thought becomes inflexible. Clearly, it is often desirable and sometimes necessary that categories must be fixed for a short time in

order for analysis to proceed. Fundamentally, it is epistemologically necessary that a thing be identifiable and placed in a category, which remains fixed for the initial period of analysis. Analysis would be impossible without this step². However, if the categories get fixed for too long and/or objects cannot move between fixed categories, this can inhibit change in theoretical knowledge. Rather, Dow advocates a dynamic approach in which categories (and therefore classifications) can only be fixed temporarily, categories can change and perhaps combine with each other. One example she uses is the (dialectical) process of synthesis.

This paper agrees that often the creation of dualistic categories is dangerous; and argues that the dualism crucially occurs often for rhetorical reasons. Thus, the act of dualism₂ can serve a rhetorical purpose. Further, as shall be seen, the level of abstraction adopted by a theorist can be selected for rhetorical purposes.

It should be noted further that the principle of dualism could apply equally to n categories, i.e. a plurality. Thus, a seemingly pluralistic formulation can be dualistic in the same way as described above, except that the number of categories is n . Thus, in Figure 2 below, we have n categories, A, ..., n, lying along a continuum. A, M and Z, are three stations along the continuum. A, M and Z act as attractors, such that fault lines at i and j , have the same effect as above. Points to the left of i become equivalent to A, points to the right become equivalent to M. The logic is the same as above.

Figure 2: Pluralism as dualism₂



2.2 Rhetoric

Part of the recent surge in methodological investigation has been the literature on rhetoric. This literature is principally associated with McCloskey (1983, 1994, 1998) and Klammer (Klammer, 1982; see also Klammer, McCloskey and Solow, 1988), although some of the implications and techniques have been taken up by other writers. For example, the method of interviewing economists and publishing these conversations has been adopted by Harcourt and King (1995), King (1995), Dunn (2002). The rhetoric literature embraces many of the themes of the philosophical tradition of postmodernism (for a commentary, see Sarup, 1993). It attacks the modernist/positivist, Cartesian “Received View” and prescriptivist Methodology (e.g. Blaug 1980) in general. It argues that the official methodology of economics, based on objectivism, hypothesis testing and

² Colander (2000) argues that categories must be fixed for them to be useful. That implies that dualism in Dow’s sense is in one sense desirable. However, he also goes to argue that some terms may be fixed for too long. He cites the example of neo-classical economics, which he claims changed considerably, yet the category defining it did not.

falsification is not the one actually followed by economists; and moreover, that that is a good thing, because it is not the one followed by science defined more broadly. For example, as Ziliak and McCloskey (2004) argue, statistical testing has an arbitrary basis and often reaches meaningless conclusions. Further, rather than rejecting theories for which contradictory evidence has been found, economists believe theories with much greater tenacity than is justified by the evidence: marginalism is one example.

Instead, economists use tricks of style, code words, appeals to authority; naturalistic/physical metaphors, including the metaphor of mathematics; metaphors of war, battle, games; appeals to aesthetics (e.g. simplicity); and appeals to expertise in mathematics. Their arguments are informed by strong prior beliefs, and, contrary to the strict fact/value distinction adopted in positivism, moral positions. This process is facilitated by the formation of interest groups (of which there are many examples). Above all, arguments are designed to be persuasive; and in order to do this; economists attempt to tell convincing stories, to use persuasive narrative. And if the story is not convincing enough initially, economists change tack and attempt to persuade in a different way. These are the techniques of conversation; and economists are engaged in a conversation with other economists (and others). Persuasiveness explains why some methods and theories become dominant; they win particular language games.

Overall, therefore, the rhetoric approach invites economics to be viewed in a different way. In many ways, economics becomes more attractive, lively and interesting, removed from its scientific straitjacket. However, this does not mean that economics descends into chaos; the rhetoric of economics is the rules of disciplined conversation. It is more than “mere rhetoric”; rather it involves probing what people think they (ought to) believe; finding good reasons/grounds for belief; and honest argument to an audience. McCloskey and others argue that an appreciation of rhetoric will create better conversation, greater tolerance and better understanding of disagreement.

2.3 Rhetorical dualism

The literature on rhetoric and the work on dualism can be combined into the concept of rhetorical dualism: dualism for rhetorical purposes³. That in turn suggests that the dualism is intentional; whether or not it is conscious is left open. Two alternatives are possible. One is that the dualism is accidental; if Dow is correct that modern thought has tended to be dualist, people might be viewed as being trapped in a Cartesian mindset, unable to escape and merely prone to thinking dualistically. Further, a writer may end up in a position of dualism because of rhetorical reasons. Both of these cases would be unintentional dualism. Second, though, it could be argued that rhetoric is not the only reason for setting up a dual. Thus, not all written economics would not be rhetoric, and some is devoid of the desire to persuade. It might be that the dual is heuristic, i.e. a stage in thought, a proposition, a temporary point in the development of an argument.


³ Mehta (1993) identifies the use of dualist language in debates over bargaining. Specifically she identifies use of language such ‘friends’ and ‘non-friends’. However, this is not formalised or generalised to “‘x’-‘non-x’” language as Dow does, or as proposed here.

Technically this may be consistent with McCloskey's position. She does not claim that everything written is rhetoric. She writes: "No speech with intent is 'nonrhetorical'. Rhetoric is not everything, but it is everywhere in the speech of human persuaders" (1998: 8). Further: "In other words, rhetoric is speech with an audience. All speech that intends to persuade is rhetorical, from higher math to lower advertising" (1994: 51). She also claims (1994: 78) that while 100% of the value added of lawyers and PR people is based on persuasion, only 25% of the value added of those working in natural sciences is attributable to persuasion. However, given that rhetoric "is the whole art of argument" (1994: 35) and that this includes the range of techniques and evidence, it is hard to fathom why only 25% of what natural scientists do is persuasive. So, McCloskey's definitions suggest that rhetoric may be all written and spoken work by the scientist, meaning that the distinction between rhetorical/heuristic dualism is invalid. However, McCloskey's quantitative estimates suggest that the distinction is valid. In this paper, the definition of rhetorical used will be some intermediate point between arguing that rhetoric is all language used, i.e. the entire conversation, in economics and adopting the modern pejorative definition of rhetoric as ornamental.

It may be inevitable that concepts develop dualistically. To define an unfamiliar object in terms of the familiar is clearly a common (general) dialectical technique. However, how this is done is significant, as follows. Often a dualist₂ process occurs. The unfamiliar is defined in terms of the familiar by placing it in opposition to it. Often the similarities between the two are ignored. For example, one might define irrationality in terms of rationality, missing intermediate concepts. Indeed, this is the central point of Dow's work: that dualism leads to errors.

A further distinction is to note the situation in which one or both of the polar concepts are knowingly false. That is, the theorist knows that the category captures no real entity, or possible entity. If this was done (or at least interpreted as such) for rhetorical reasons, it can also be described as rhetorical dualism. Therefore, when a politician attempts to exaggerate the position of an opponent, or a prosecution lawyer tries to convince the jury that a witness is, based on small indiscretions or untruths, in fact a bare-faced liar, this is a form of rhetorical dualism. In the first case, the purpose of doing so is to emphasise that the politician has a very different view. Or it can be to show that the politician adopts moderate positions, compared to his extremist opponent. Another case would be that in which a politician aims to push out the boundary of the other's definition in order to create space in the middle for him or herself. The process of this form of dualism, called here dualism_{2a}, is illustrated in Figure 3 below. Here, the rhetorical act has two parts: i) the continuum of concepts between X and Y is split by the fault line Z; and ii) the true point X is transformed into a false version of it, X', which becomes the new pole.

Figure 3: Dualism_{2a}




Again, it might be argued that to focus on oppositions is the basis of dialectical thought. However, even if the intention of the theorist is to think dialectically, many such thought processes result in dualisms₂. Also, it might be claimed that oppositions need to be created if new positions are to be created. However, thinking dialectically does not license knowingly false categories. Hegel was clear that he believed that the dialectic was the correct way to think about the world because the world operated dialectically. Thus, Hegel demanded an ontological licence as Dow does: a mere appeal to dialectic does not licence departures from reality which are known to be false⁴.

Often rhetorical dualism might take place via the choice of a level of abstraction. Specifically, where at one level of abstraction there are many categories, it is possible to choose a level of abstraction which creates two categories only. For example, it is possible within economics to identify the following levels: theory, schools of thought, and worldview. Clearly to group theories into schools of thought is an act of abstraction from the differences between the theories to claim that they have a common essence. This process (simplified) is displayed in Figure 4. Here we observe the three levels, theory, school and meta-level. The meta-level may be ontological, epistemological, methodological, and even ethical. In each case, there is a continuum of possibilities. It may also be, as above, that the continuum represents a polarity, although in this particular case, that is less likely. Let us consider the theory level first. In each case, the continuum is interrupted by a fault line, and the process of dualism is continued as above in Figures 1 and 2. Thus, theories A and B are collapsed into each other in school I, etc. At level 2, there is a pluralism of schools, but that pluralism remains a dualistic process, as explained in figure 3. Finally at level 3, differences between schools of thought I and J, and K and L, respectively are collapsed into meta-categories M and N; whereas the differences between J and K, which previously were small, have been accentuated.

⁴ The claim of falsity clearly raises the issue of truth. Typically, the rhetoric literature is associated with pragmatism, which holds that truth is merely whatever is believed to be true, via a process of persuasive argument. Mäki (1993) argues that as well as the non-realist rhetoric, a realist rhetoric is possible, in which rhetoric is associated with the search for truth. Clearly, this is a thorny issue, which this paper cannot deal with adequately. It should be noted, of course, that Dow adopts a fallibilist realist position. A synthesis of that with McCloskey's pragmatism is therefore not straightforward. Implicitly this paper adopts a realist approach to rhetoric, in that the conversation being analysed is rooted in some reality, such that positions adopted can be unfair and indeed false.

Figure 4: rhetorical dualism via level of abstraction



This manoeuvre can be useful in thought – and can lead to or even constitute genuine insight – but can also be questionable. Clearly, to claim that theories A...D can be placed in the meta-level category M (and likewise E...H are grouped into N) abstracts from what may be some significant similarities between theories and schools of thought on different sides of the claimed divide, as well as differences between theories and schools of thought on the same sides. For instance, though theories D and E are adjacent in the theoretical continuum and therefore similar in many ways, but can be placed into different schools of thought and on different sides of the fault line at level 3; and therefore they are considered fundamentally different. Arguably both Lawson (1997) and Potts (2000) go further, to choose a level of abstraction from actual schools of thought which highlights a specific ontological feature – closed vs. open systems; and integral/non-integral space respectively – to claim that economics can be split down the middle into two highly distinct approaches. Such an abstraction allows both authors to make larger claims about the impact and importance of their own contribution. Again, that is not to claim that the authors were (either solely, or indeed at all) motivated by that consideration; but that the effect has been such.

Identifying rhetorical dualism is a three-stage process: identify the dualism present in a distinction (either dualism₁ or dualism₂); then, identify whether the continuum has been set up as a split pole (and in the case of dualism_{2a}, whether it was false); and identify a purpose for the dualism, usually either for or rhetorical reasons. It should be noted that is not claimed that if a dualism is identified, it must be rhetorical (or some variant of that). As stated above, the dualism may have been unintended. Of course, in some cases, there may be sufficient ontological licence for the dual. In other cases, it will not be possible to assess the dualism in that way. In those cases, a (somewhat unsatisfactory) position of ‘pending classification’ is necessary. Of course, in no cases is it the intention to accuse the author in question of any form of intellectual dishonesty. It might be, however, that unconscious motives or beliefs are causally relevant, and thus should be examined.

Rhetorical dualism is problematic for several reasons, including those general objections to dualism made by Dow (*passim*). Dow emphasises what might be called the path dependency of investigation, and the (*usually* negative) effect of dualism on that investigation. Dualism serves to fix categories, to categorise things incorrectly, and most

significantly, to fix the path of the investigation, directing it along incorrect routes and excluding the more fruitful. Also, these types of dualism can lead the researcher to misjudge their target and therefore to embrace imbalanced theories. Also, drawing on McCloskey's approach, rhetorical dualism can reduce the quality of a conversation, by making it more difficult for two sides to communicate with each other, by creating strict, irreconcilable categories. In some cases, admittedly, the rhetorical dualism may be intended to *end* the conversation. For example, accusing one's opponent of being unscientific is a way of ending a conversation prematurely.

At this stage it would be helpful to recapitulate on the types of dualism – rhetorical dualism if they are practised for rhetorical reasons – we might find. 1) dualism₁: the segregation of *n* categories into two mutually exclusive, exhaustive, fixed categories, or simply the tendency to think in terms of those two; 2) dualism₂: the use of a fault line and treatment of end points as attracting poles, in order to achieve the same effect as in (1); 3) dualism_{2a}, which is identical to (2) except that at least one of the poles is false; 4) the choice of a level of abstraction which generates the distinctions found in (1-3); 5) the use of (1-4) for three purposes: a) the creation of opposites, to the benefit of one of the opposites; b) the creation of opposites to establish one of the opposites as a new, innovative position; c) the creation of opposites in order to make space in the middle for a compromise or synthetic position.

Feminist economics has done a considerable amount of work in identifying dualisms, which are rhetorical and have subjugational effects on women in particular. They identify series of dualisms in the language of economics which they argue reflects a masculine/feminine distinction, to the disadvantage of the latter (see for example, Kuiper, 2001; Folbre, 1993; Nelson, 1992, 1995). Similarly, McCloskey (*passim*) identifies, for example, a science/non-science distinction to the detriment of the latter (discussed below). However, these accounts do not attempt to generalise, or place the rhetorical moves in a logical framework of dualism. It is the purpose of this paper to a) demonstrate that the practice of rhetorical dualism is commonplace in economics and b) to apply this to specific cases relevant to contemporary economics.

3. Case studies in rhetorical dualism

First, it is necessary to demonstrate the rhetorical dualism is significant economics. This will be done via some case studies taken from economic literature. The cases are necessarily brief treatments worthy of further development; however, a brief treatment seems sufficient to make the case presented here. This section shows there is a considerable number of cases in the history of economic thought in which duals have been created for rhetorical reasons, such as to portray an opponent as extremist, or to portray existing literature as being clustered around two extremes, in order to cast one's own work as capturing the middle ground. We focus on three, but other examples abound. Keynes (1936) constructed a category of the 'classical' as anything preceding (and therefore fundamentally separate from) his own work. Famously, when Friedman (1953) argues that because models are necessarily unrealistic, therefore the realism of assumptions is irrelevant, he is making an argument which leaps from what end of a

rhetorical dual to another. Colander (2000) provides further historical examples, such as Marx's use of the classical/vulgar distinction and Veblen's (1900) use of the term 'neoclassical' to disparage mainstream economics. When Finn (2003) talks of the debate over markets being conducted in terms of force of argument about 'capitalism' and 'socialism', he is talking about rhetorical dualism. 3629

3.1 Mishan and the growth debate

Mishan (1977) provides another example of rhetorical dualism. Interestingly, Mishan implicitly accuses others of rhetorical dualism, whilst himself likely engaging in it. For example, he continually attacks what he describes as a groups favouring economic growth, about which he claims, "...the impression they convey is generally the same: that if, somehow, all adverse spillover effects could be properly corrected, any residual economic growth could not but produce an improvement of social welfare. This view is wholly misleading" (34). He then goes on to argue that their position is overstated, and that although there might well be some beneficial spillover effects of growth, one cannot assume that they would all be beneficial to quality of life. What Mishan is attempting to do is criticise another group of theorists for rhetorical dualism and to argue against it. However, in doing so, Mishan uses dualistic language himself. His use of the concept of a group favouring economic growth is one example. What meaning does such a concept have? Is it possible for such a group to exist? How would one know? It is seldom that a group of economists are polled, as in a referendum, and required to answer a question with binary answers. It is more likely that even if an economist were prone to say that in general they favour economic growth, it is likely that their reasons for doing so, and the caveats they place on their response, would differ; and thus to group them thus is something of a distortion. Also, in the quotation above, Mishan is using rhetorically dualist language: he claims that their reaction is '*generally* the same', that '*somehow all* adverse spillover effects' would be beneficial, and therefore that *any* residual growth 'could not but be beneficial'. By using the words 'generally', 'all' and 'any', Mishan is collapsing distinctions.

Our impression of Mishan's approach is strengthened by his further claim that "...the growthman likes nothing better to be heard championing the sacred right of the ordinary man to spend his money just as he pleases" (1977: 87). Mishan is being highly rhetorical here. Several phrases stand out. The term 'the growthman' is designed to create the impression of a distinct group; it even suggests tribalism. Further, the phrase "likes nothing better" is a reductionist caricature of a man with simple desires; 'nothing better' suggests that this activity is at the extreme end of his continuum of preferences. The term "sacred right" is a mocking exaggeration of the strength with which the growth theorist holds their view. The phrase "to be heard championing" is also a caricature of the growth theorist: the use of the word 'champion' is an exaggeration and also is ridiculing, because it is a mediaeval metaphor; and the claim that the growth theorist likes to 'be heard' is an attack on their personality, since it suggests a weakness for praise and attention. None of this is to seriously suggest that Mishan is engaged in any more than light-hearted, tongue-in-cheek banter; but the desire seems to be to undermine his opponents via parody. This impression is strengthened by Mishan's claim that his opponents "use the smattering of


history they have to select the bleaker aspects of particular periods in the past” to make their case. He is accusing them of ignorance – of history – and of exaggeration and selective quotation.

3.2 Critical realism

Critical Realism (hereafter CR) is a philosophy of science, developed principally by Roy Bhaskar (see 1978, 1979, 1986 for the material most relevant to this debate) and interlocuted (and developed) for economists mainly by Tony Lawson. It can be claimed that CR is extensively dualist: Mearman (2002) claims that over five hundred examples of dualistic distinctions can be found in CR literature; and that many of these examples are rhetorical. Some of these claims are made by other critical realists. For example, Collier (1994: 237-8) accuses Bhaskar of being lopsided in his treatment of other philosophies of science; he argues that Bhaskar attacks positivism too much and hermeneutics too little. This is arguably a consequence of Bhaskar caricaturing positivism, in order to contrast it sharply with hermeneutics: a case of asymmetrical dualism₂ where only one of the poles is extended. Overall, CR engages in rhetorical dualism of various types, either in its formulation at the same level, or in its choice of level of abstraction at which distinctions are made. It is clearly beyond the scope of this paper to demonstrate this claim in full, but some illustrative examples can be offered.

The first example is on Bhaskar’s treatment of realism. The summary of his treatment is shown in Figure 5 below.

Figure 5: SIX TYPES OF REALISM:-



It is widely acknowledged (see, for example, Bitsakis, 1993, Lawson, 1997 and Mäki, 1998) that realism as a term is problematic, mainly because of its many variants. Indeed, Bhaskar uses several different labels for his own philosophy as it develops. Bhaskar (1986; hereafter, *SR*: 5) defines his approach as a (metaphysical) scientific realism⁵,

⁵ Note that in Bhaskar (1991: 141) the further distinction between *scientistic* and *scientific* realisms is made. The former is that “which attributes overwhelming evaluative and/or historically explanatory pre-eminence to the social institutions of science.” Bhaskar is making distinct the territory occupied by his theory. This clearly serves a polemical function, although that is not to say that the distinction *exists* for that reason.

wherein objects exist independent of investigation into them. The section from which this is taken (SR: 5-10) is illustrative of both the problematic nature of 'realism' and of the dualism within Bhaskar. Bhaskar notes that given the mind-, thought-, or investigation-independence of objects in metaphysical scientific realism, it is "immediately opposed to both empiricism and rationalism" (SR: 6), as well as the *epistemic fallacy* committed by both (SR: 6).

This phrasing is significant: scientific realism is *opposed* to both empiricism and rationalism. This suggests a strict distinction, *perhaps* polarity, between scientific realism and the previous prevailing philosophical methods. This is a significant feature in Bhaskar's writing: to make clear and distinct a place for CR in the history of the philosophy of science. The word 'opposed' clearly serves a rhetorical function: otherwise, 'differs from', 'is different to' or even 'objects to' would suffice. Significantly, even though scientific realism is opposed to both empiricism and rationalism, for CR, empiricism and rationalism are also opposite: "Broadly speaking, philosophers divided into two camps:...*rationalist*...[and]...the opposed *empiricist* position" (emphasis in original) (SR: 235-6). Claims abound that CR is a dialectical synthesis of previous perspectives (see below; see Dow, 2000), however it is not usual for the synthesis to be opposite to both thesis and antithesis, as the synthesis acts to (as SR, p. 60, on the relationship between realism, deductivism and contextualism) "incorporate the situated strengths of both." Here, it might be argued that false polar oppositions are being set up for rhetorical purposes. This is an example of rhetorical dualism₂.

Returning to SR (5-10), a strong claim is made: "...every philosophy, inasmuch as it takes science for its topic, is essentially a realism, or at least takes realism for its principle, the pertinent questions being only *how far* and *in what form* this principle is actually implemented" (emphasis in original) (SR: 7). This claim is explicitly (SR: 7; n. 17) *opposite* to Hegel (1969: 154-5), and also sets up realism as a replacement or opposite to idealism. This is clearly polarising language. Bhaskar supports his claim by quoting Bachelard (1953: 141) that "all philosophy...presupposes a *reality*" (emphasis added). Bhaskar then uses his claim to attempt to codify much (if not all) philosophy in realist terms. Thus, a continuum can be imagined encompassing a) transcendental realism, b) empirical realism, c) objective conceptual realism, d) transcendent realism, e) intuitional realism, and f) subjective conceptual realism. These are the points on the continuum (1) in Figure 5 above. (a), as outlined above, is Bhaskar's own theory of scientific realism (also described above as metaphysical scientific realism⁶). (b), is where real objects are "defined in terms of actual or possible experience" (SR: 7). (c), is where real objects are independent of minds but remain "quintessentially rational...constituted by and/or causally or teleologically dependent upon what is known to us only as an attribute of *human* being, namely thought or reason" (emphasis in original) (SR: 8). (d) "posits a sphere of pure unrecognisable other-being, defined in terms of its *inaccessibility*

⁶ This is to distinguish it from 'internal realism', an *a posteriori*, empirical, scientific realism, associated with Putnam (1978), which assesses realism by virtue of the behaviour of scientists. In distinguishing these, Bhaskar clearly draws on an *a posteriori/a priori* distinction. Note that Dow (1985: 21) rejects that distinction. Note also that internal realism is, at least intuitively, consistent with the metaphysical scientific realism, and that the latter encompasses the former. This changes the nature of the distinction.

to human being” (emphasis in original) (SR: 8). (e) defines objects purely in terms of human intuition. (f) defines real objects as purely the products of thought, “unconstrained by sense-experience” (SR: 7).

It appears that, in this passage, Bhaskar is careful to avoid collapsing distinctions, and to avoid polar categories. Moreover, there are clearly overlaps between categories (a-f), for example between (e) and (f). However, Bhaskar does also attempt to group them together under broader banners. For example, (b-c) and (e-f) are described as “anthroporealisms” (SR: 7-8), as depending upon humans. More significantly, these realist categories contain idealisms. (b) includes both empiricism (and its opponent) Kantian transcendental idealism. (f) is also known as “super-idealism” (SR: 7). Additionally, (d) is said to include Kantian noumena (SR: 8). This clouds the picture somewhat. Also, it completes the inversion of the Hegelian position, in that realism encompasses idealism as some form of ‘not realism.’ However, up to this point, Bhaskar has resisted such obvious dualism. Shortly after though, he capitulates, by making a sharp distinction between realism and ‘irrealism’, which is “any *non-transcendental* realism, i.e., any incomplete, inexplicit or ineffable realism...[including] empirical, conceptual, intuitional and/or transcendent realism” (emphasis added) (SR: 9). Irrealism is ‘not-TR.’ Thus from a subtle series of distinctions between brands of realism, each brand being a (somewhat) distinct station along a continuum, the analysis has shifted to a blunt dualism₂, wherein anything that is not TR is irrealist (and visa-versa). This is shown in Figure 5 by the fault line splitting the categories as shown on line 2. Bhaskar (SR: 23-4) also introduces a new explicitly polar distinction, within the irrealist domain, of transcendent/immanent irrealism. This is shown on line 3 of Figure 5. The purpose of this distinction is arguably not heuristic, since it is not utilised in that way⁷. Therefore, it can be argued that its main function is to once again make clear the distinctiveness of TR, and that this in turn performs a rhetorical, political, or polemical function. Similar patterns can be seen in other critical realist literature, for example in the use of the term ‘non-realism’, the absence of an external reality (see Collier, 1994: 12-16). Collier (*passim*) equates non-realism and idealism. Clearly, non-realism is a narrower category than irrealism. Realism remains, though, an over-arching term, such that “non-realists may in the end turn out to be realists about something” (Collier: 12). Collier seems to be guilty of some form of dualism. As usual, it is difficult to claim that realism/non-realism represents a dual₁, but the way in which several types of clearly distinct strands of non-realism are collapsed is suggestive of dualism₂. It is also easy to show that this separation is crucial to a) the operation and b) the distinctiveness of TR, so does have a rhetorical function.

Mearman (2002, ch. 3) presents similar arguments for the treatments of CR in relation to positivism, *empirical realism* (effectively, empiricism), and postmodernism and on the debate within CR over naturalism. In all these cases CR (principally, Bhaskar) engages in one or both of two manoeuvres, either a) to create a fault line on a continuum of philosophical positions such that a dualism₂ is created; or b) to choose a level of abstraction at which a dualism is possible. By collapsing known distinctions at one stratum, in order to examine a contrast at another, the researcher is trying to move from

⁷ Indeed, the only other use of this distinction found in this investigation is on SR (160) where Bhaskar contrasts the respective positions on the epistemic value of experience.

the concrete, complex to an abstract conception of the essential contrast between categories. This manoeuvre was illustrated in Figure 4 earlier. Mearman (2002, ch. 3) calls such a manoeuvre an 'abstractionist defence', but in fact, how much of a defence is it? Such abstractions can be useful for heuristic reasons, for thinking through a problem. However, where it is rhetorical, it is less easily justified. This point is particularly true for CR, which in other contexts attacks others for inappropriate abstractions. Why choose a particular level of abstraction simply to make an argument? Does this illuminate or explain more effectively than otherwise? That is the criticism CR makes of others, so it cannot be marshalled in defence of CR.

A second problem, from Dow's perspective, with the abstractionist defence is that dualism, even where strictly justified (as in many of the cases discussed here), as well as obscuring information as several distinct categories are collapsed into each other, can lead to path dependence problems. This problem is evident widely, for instance in Economics. For instance, Mearman (2006) has examined the CR treatment of the concept of 'open systems', one with specific, significant methodological implications. He argues that CR tends to operate within only two categories of system openness, either completely closed – defined by an event regularity of the type 'if event x, then event y' – or not closed, and hence open, wherein no event regularity occurs. Correspondingly, methods which appear to presuppose closure, or involve closure in *any* way are considered 'closed-system methods', whereas a group of other methods, principally those devised by Lawson under the heading of contrast explanation, are considered 'open systems methods'. Further, closed-systems methods are rejected except when the strictest ontological conditions (i.e. an actual closure of the event regularity form) are met.

One implication of this form of reasoning is that for a long time, critical realists rejected econometrics, on the grounds that econometric methods pre-suppose event regularities. However, Downward and Mearman (2002, forthcoming) and Mearman (2004, 2006) argue that in fact the methods advocated by CR in economics also presuppose closure of some degree (albeit likely less than econometrics), such that to reject methods on the basis of the presence of closure would be self-defeating for CR as it would be left with no tools of analysis. Further, degrees of closure are identified both in reality and in different methods. This argument leads to the subsequent one that methods should be combined (Downward and Mearman, 2002, forthcoming). In this context, the significant argument is that CR was adopting an extreme position of rejection of all methods of closure. It collapsed together many different types of system, with different degrees of closure, and different types of methods, which also had different degrees of closure (for example, Finch and McMaster, 2002 have argued that because they do not presuppose a specific probability distribution, non-parametric statistics involve less closure than parametric statistics).

So, CR was engaged in dualism₂. Crucially, also, it was adopting that position in order to make a rhetorical point, i.e. to force economists to confront the ontological assumptions being made by their methods (and therefore by extension, themselves). CR in economics was engaged in rhetorical dualism. Further, this was problematic, because it was pushing CR in economics in a particular direction, which was not the only one available and also

may have been self-defeating, as well as being perhaps less effective than a strategy based around a more careful use of methods, perhaps involving a triangulation of methods (see Downward and Mearman, forthcoming).

3.3 Monetarists and Keynesians

A further example of rhetorical dualism is the debate between Monetarists and Keynesians which took place during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. A full treatment of the debate is beyond the scope of this paper; however, a couple of contributions suffice to demonstrate the tenor of the debate and the rhetorical dualism present in it. The first is the early commentary on the dispute by Harry Johnson. Given his extensive and influential work on trade theory and on synthesising 'Keynesian' and neo-classical perspectives (see Johnson, 1967, 1969) his commentary on the Keynesian revolution and the Monetarist counter-revolution (1971) has some authority. It is a case study on rhetorical dualism.

Johnson (1971) shows how both the 'Keynesian' revolution and the Monetarist counter-revolution used rhetorical and dualistic devices to attack the prevailing orthodoxies, which were neo-classical and 'Keynesian' economics respectively. Theorists on both sides of the debate created homogeneous, over-simplified (i.e., dualist₂) and even false (dualist_{2a}) definitions of their opponents. This had two strategic benefits for theorists: first, it created an intellectual environment more favourable to their views; and second, by portraying opponents as extremist, the theorists created more space in that environment in which they could operate. Johnson (3) makes the important claim that it is part of the nature of an orthodoxy "to reduce the subtle and sophisticated thoughts of great men [sic] to a set of simple principles and straightforward slogans..." This suggests that some form of dualism₂ is inevitable; but Johnson shows how protagonists attempted to exploit this opportunity.

For instance, Johnson (1971: 4) argues that both groups developed apparently new concepts, but in fact gave "old concepts new and confusing names" in order to create the impression of being radical and *different*: Johnson gives the example of the marginal *productivity* of capital becoming (he claims) the marginal *efficiency* of capital. Thus, he claims that scholars on both sides of the debate tended to claim to reject certain ideas, while in fact positing new names for the ideas they claimed to reject. That is, they refused to acknowledge the content of the previous orthodoxy (which they were attempting to overthrow) in their 'new' theories. This is rhetorical dualism₂, for three reasons: first, Johnson argues (*passim*) that in fact the 'Keynesian' and Monetarist positions are at least partially internally related; second, both the internal relationality and the overlapping segments of the two main categories are denied by the theorists involved; and third, it is clear that this denial is made for rhetorical reasons.

Johnson (1971: 8) also notes that the Monetarists ignored the varieties of Keynesian positions on the neutrality of money supply and that "this *difference was easily and conveniently blurred, to the benefit of the counter-revolution*, by seizing on the extreme Keynesian position that money does not matter at all as the prevailing orthodoxy"

(emphasis added). Moreover, Johnson (10) argues, the Monetarist claim that the new quantity theory was validated by the discovery of a stable demand for money function was “justified only by the identification of the Keynesian orthodoxy with the proposition that money does not matter and that velocity is either highly unstable or infinitely interest-inelastic”. These are both examples of dualism₂. Finally, Johnson (11) claims that “[t]he Keynesian revolution derived a large part of its intellectual appeal from the *deliberate caricaturing* and denigration of honest and humble scholars” (emphasis added): this clearly suggests rhetorical dualism_{2a}.

Support for Johnson’s commentary can be found in Chrystal’s (1979) book on UK macroeconomic controversies. On the one hand, Chrystal is attacking (what can be described as) the rhetorical dualism of others. He writes, “...the majority of economists would not fit easily into any of the factions caricatured in the following three chapters” (49), i.e. into the competing groups which were said to exist on macroeconomic questions. In other words, most economists are eclectic in some way, but these differences are lost in categorisations. He is implicitly arguing that the level of abstraction chosen to create groups is unhelpful. Chrystal also expresses the hope that “...future controversies will not be conducted with the vitriolic dogmatism that has often characterised ‘Cambridge controversies’ (both in capital theory and macroeconomics) in the past” (188).

Revealingly, Chrystal goes on to claim: “The Keynesian assumption of perfectly elastic outputs and exogenous prices and the ‘rational expectations’ view of exogenous (‘natural’) levels of output and employment accompanied by perfectly elastic prices are polar cases. The truth obviously lies somewhere in between, but it is by no means clear, in the present state of knowledge, that the former is a better assumption than the latter” (187). This is an interesting passage for a number of reasons. First, Chrystal is explicitly rejecting the polar extremes (as he sees them) of the debate. The debate he discusses should be familiar to undergraduate students of economics in the exposition of the IS-LM and AS-AD models. Chrystal is complaining that the debate is being carried out in terms of extremes, and the middle ground is being ignored (i.e. dualism₂ is occurring). Moreover, he implies that the debate is damaging, given that ‘the truth obviously lies somewhere in between’. However, the passage is also revealing because it suggests a preference by Chrystal for one view, i.e. the Monetarist (further evidence that Chrystal favours this position can be found in Chrystal, 1981, 1983, 1990). That prompts us to ask whether the characterisation of the Keynesian view is fair. Certainly, the claim that prices are exogenous and the output is perfectly elastic seems to be a caricature of the Keynesian view that employment adjusts to demand shocks and that even under flexible prices, there can be demand-deficient unemployment (see Keynes, 1936, ch. 19). In that light, Chrystal’s appeal against rhetorical dualism seems to be employing a false pole and is therefore itself an example of dualism_{2a}.

Indeed, Chrystal’s discussion of the issue suggests that while appealing against polarised debate, he is in fact engaged in it. For example, he writes: “There has remained to this day in the UK a group of ‘extreme Keynesians’ who appear to have taken up even more entrenched positions rather than admit that their model may be improved by adding

monetary variables. Their uniting factor is this opposition to Monetarism rather than any coherent interpretation of ‘pure’ Keynesian economics. The particular forte of this group is thinking up people other than British Chancellors (and their economic advisers!) to blame for UK inflation” (66)⁸. Again, this is an instructive passage. Whether or not his description of the New Cambridge position is fair is one matter, which we shall not discuss. However, it is worth noting that Chrystal seems to fall into the errors of labelling which Johnson (1971) warns against.

Fortunately, the language used by Chrystal is rich enough. Note the use of the monikers ‘extreme’ and ‘pure’. On the one hand, Chrystal mocks what he sees as rhetorical dualism and an inflexibility of thought by economists hanging on to a ‘purist’ position. Similar criticism might be aimed at ‘fundamentalist’ Keynesians (i.e. some Post Keynesians) today. However, Chrystal is rhetorically dualist himself by claiming that there is an extremist unifying cause around which this ‘group’ (whether or not such a group existed is arguable) congregates. He reinforces this with the tactic of *reductio ad absurdum* in his parody of the group found above. Further, the term ‘extreme’ is pejorative and rhetorical. It is intended to create a separation of the group from the mainstream, and for that separation to be a strong one: extremists are unreasonable and intolerable.

Chrystal’s treatment follows a familiar pattern in which an economist appears to want to transcend a debate but ends up (or aims to) creating positions which are as strong as the ones s/he criticises. Chrystal (1979: 121) argued that on an issue such as inflation, one cannot take a side; yet, his language is rhetorically dualist, particularly in his portrayal of non-neoclassical synthesis Keynesians. Here, Chrystal appears to commit both rhetorical dualism₂ and dualism_{2a}. Perhaps this is not surprising, given that Chrystal, elsewhere in his book, explicitly argues against adopting both sides of an argument, by claiming, “...progress is not made by ‘two-handed’ economists. It makes for a much more interesting book if the author’s view is clearly stated” (1979: 6). For him, then, rhetorical dualism serves a heuristic purpose: it is necessary for the argument to progress; yet, of course, this is not necessary, as a firm position can be one lying between extremes just as easily as it can be one of the extremes.

Johnson’s (1971) essay too does not escape criticism, as excellent an expose of “the techniques of scholarly chicanery” as it is. For instance, there is his reference to a “Keynesian revolution in *monetary* theory” (2, emphasis added), which is selective at best. Further, his claim that Keynes’ marginal efficiency of capital is merely a renaming of the marginal productivity concept is not strictly true because the latter concept is independent of cost of production (see for example, Rima, 2001: 329, 463). Johnson uses this as an example of how, in order to establish a revolution in thought, old terms are renamed, in order to create the impression of innovation. Johnson is also exaggerating when he describes the *ex post* equality of savings and investment as “the *sine qua non* of right reasoning” (1971: 4). Although that equality is met at equilibrium in Keynesian models, it does not have the same weight as in classical models; and of course in Keynes the causality between savings and investment, and the mechanism by which equilibrium is brought about, are different. Johnson’s error – any irony aside – arises because he is

⁸ He then goes on specifically to criticise Kahn.

trying to paint the Keynesian revolution in a particular light. Also, Johnson is explicitly rhetorically dualist when referring to *the* Keynesian view on (for example) employment (6) whilst acknowledging a range of Keynesian views on the importance of money in the economy (8). Indeed, although he makes the distinction between types of Keynesians, and between Keynes and Keynesians, throughout his article, the distinction disappears in talk of *the* Keynesian view. It could be argued that the distinction is merely a consequence of abstraction; nonetheless, it serves his rhetorical purpose, which is to create the impression of debate.

3. 4 McCloskey

McCloskey (1998), as in the cases above, engages in rhetorical dualism, whilst simultaneously arguing against it. McCloskey is more explicit in her arguments against rhetorical dualism (not that she uses the term) than Johnson or Bhaskar. She argues that there is a rhetoric of distinction within economics. However, it can be shown that her arguments against the prevailing rhetoric actually provide examples of rhetorical dualism designed to a) carve out a distinctive position for McCloskey in the philosophy of economics and b) advocate a particular view of economics, that known as neo-classical economics, and indeed to suggest that economics *is* that view of the subject.

First, it should be acknowledged that McCloskey, without using the terminology, shares much of Dow's concern about dualistic distinctions in economics. In particular, McCloskey attacks the distinctions (rhetorical dualisms) of content/style, substance/rhetoric and science/literature (see particularly, 1998: ch. 2). For McCloskey, the way the economics is written as important as the argument itself; indeed, the style and content are inseparable. If all writing has an implicit desire to persuade, then the persuasiveness of the language used is not "mere" rhetoric and is not garnish on the substance of the argument; rather it is as important and inseparable from the argument. Morgan (2001) echoes this argument to claim that economic models are inseparable from the stories they are used to tell. Similarly, McCloskey holds that economic "science is a collection of literary forms, not a Science [and accordingly, that] literary forms are scientific" (McCloskey, 1998: 21). For example, economics is a form of poetry (12, 47). An extension of this argument is her claim that the distinction between science and aesthetics breaks down, because positivists appeal to virtues such as simplicity and beauty in their arguments (see, for example, Debreu, 1984; and Russell's (1953) description of mathematics). The capitalisation of 'science' signifies that McCloskey wishes to change the definition of science from the modernist, positivist one to a more flexible definition, one which stresses systematicity (McCloskey: 20) but allows a broader range of techniques and types of enquiry to be acknowledged as valid than is currently the case. In many ways, this process exemplifies Dow's preference: McCloskey wants to reject an existing distinction and to in fact change the definition of the categories to reflect dynamic interaction between them: specifically, from Science/literature we move to a definition of science which stresses its literary aspects. McCloskey is therefore challenging further duals, such as Science/science (19), social knowledge/objective scientific knowledge (108), science/religion (173), scientific/humanistic (177) and

quantitative=science/qualitative=non-science (20). Many of the same themes are present in McCloskey (1994).

This pattern of transcending dualisms is repeated throughout McCloskey's work. In McCloskey (1998), in addition to those discussed above, she challenges a range of other dualisms: economical/uneconomical (as in Posner, 1972: 3), metaphor/reality (12), evidence/reason (19), theory/experience (31), and official rhetoric/actual rhetoric (37 et passim). McCloskey (16) cites a passage by Mitchell (quoted in Rossetti, 1992: 220) in which a number of hierarchical dualisms are used or which McCloskey imputes: "thought/wishing,..., sciences/mere humanities,..., study/beach reading,..., view/grounded conviction" and challenges them. Later, she quotes another series of duals, in the context of the demarcation problem, including:- fact/value, objective/subjective, positive/normative, rigorous/intuitive, precise/vague, cognition/feeling, hard/soft. It is clear that challenging these duals also implies challenging positivism. Of course, such a challenge is not neutral. McCloskey clearly favours the pragmatist philosophy and wants to attack positivism in order to advance her preferred alternative. She explicitly challenges the distinction between pragmatism and science which is sometimes drawn (5). She also questions the dualisms of correct/incorrect and true/false (passim), and criticises the notion of Truth. It is necessary to attack positivism to establish pragmatism. In so doing, it is rhetorically advantageous to create the stress the flaws in the opponent. Part of this is to stress the divisive nature of the opponent, and the fractured nature of debate it creates. Like Bhaskar, then, McCloskey's own arguments are served by highlighting and criticising a series of dualisms₂.

Again, the reason is to advance a particular view of what philosophy of science is. This can be seen in her treatment of 'methodology'. Above we saw that McCloskey attacked positivism for its flaws, including its many dualisms. However, this attack becomes an attack on all existing methodology. This is done partly by distinguishing strictly Methodology and rhetoric (184). Mainly though, it occurs through equating methodology with positivism (175). Methodology is rule-bound (156) which implies a non-rule bound, freer alternative. Methodology serves to create an Us/Them distinction, because methodology is inextricably linked to demarcation. However, McCloskey is being inconsistent here, for two reasons. First, because she does not believe in an absence of rules: indeed, she lays out those rules elsewhere (for example, McCloskey, 1983) to include codes of good behaviour. Second, rather than rid us of the term 'science', which has proved divisive in the past, McCloskey proposed that it be expanded. Science is systematic (1998: 20; see McCloskey, private 2006⁹); it is conversation (21); but it is still *science*. Further, economics *is* a science (19, 20); of this, McCloskey is in little doubt. Thus, potentially there still is a demarcation between science and non-science and one of McCloskey's key objections to Methodology is removed. However, she is not finished, because methodology is described as irrational in that it narrows the range of argument more than rational human conversation. McCloskey's choice of words here is not

⁹ McCloskey (2006, private) says: "The systematic study of the world. The 'world' can be human (literature, history, psychology, economics) or natural. The 'systematic' is what divides it from casual journalism, or from mere unstudied opinion".

coincidental: she is using the terms rational/irrational to parody the apparent claims of (positivist) methodologists to rationality, whereas non-positivists are irrational. McCloskey objects to that dual, but in reversing it, reinstates it.

Should McCloskey's treatment be viewed as harshly as those she criticises? McCloskey does demarcate between science and non-science¹⁰. The choice of the term non-science to describe something like mathematics (1994: 8) is worth examining. Non-science may be a better term than the negative 'unscience'; however, it remains a blunt distinction. The criterion for science is whether it is studied or unstudied thought (McCloskey, private, 2006). This of course raises another question about studied versus unstudied thought. How are all these distinctions arrived at? Clearly, for a category to be useful (as Colander, 2000 argues) it demarcates one thing from another¹¹; however, the choice of the mode of categorisation is optional. One might argue that, for instance, green is 'not blue'; or that maths is 'non-science'; but these categorisations are chosen and are not inevitable. They are also dualistic. There are two principal dangers in this: 1) similarities between the categories are ignored and 2) differences within the categories are ignored. That weakens our ability to criticise economics (or any other science)¹². In terms of Dow's analysis, McCloskey has made a positive contribution in questioning the dual of Science/non- or un-Science and has to some extent resolved the tension between Science/non-Science (in Deweyan fashion). The question is whether or not the distinction remains static.

Methodology is also described as authoritarian (McCloskey, 1998). This is to claim, therefore, that methodology is prescriptive. However, this is clearly a distortion of what methodology is; and to collapse all views on methodology, some of which may attempt to introduce rules, as being prescriptive. We have already seen that such an argument would be self-defeating (as McCloskey, 1994 acknowledges). It is also an inaccurate description of economic methodology at the time of McCloskey's writing, which had for some time been well aware of the perils of prescription (see Dow, 2002: 106, 130). In fact, to collapse a range of methodological positions – including positivism and those informed by it – down to a single category of Methodology is a case of dualism₂. However, of

¹⁰ McCloskey (private, 2006) says: "Sure it's demarcation. Being against the demarcation of science from art is not the same as being against demarcation in general. We need for all kinds of purposes to demarcate---say, water from sewerage, or rice from spaghetti, or good proofs from bad. The demarcation that plagues our culture is not that between unconsidered and considered opinion---that one doesn't plague us enough! It's the demarcation between Science (regularly in English conflated with physical sciences) and other carefully considered opinion about the world, such as history or literary criticism or economics. The point is that we do not need to demarcate the sciences in this way, and in fact to do so leads us to think falsely that considered opinions about economics are somehow of a different order of persuasiveness from considered opinions about geology. They are not: some scientific opinions about geology are less, not more, certain (for example) than covered interest arbitrage".

¹¹ McCloskey (2006, private) says: "Sure: journalism is not science, for example; letters to my mother are not science; philosophy is not science, since it is about our ideas rather than the world; mathematics for the same reason is not science...Well, sure: journalism, letters to Mom, mathematics. But all of them non-science. Things not blue are many different colors, such as red or yellow. But anyway not blue".

¹² McCloskey (2006, private) acknowledges: "Economics has, unhappily, allowed itself to become less of a science than it so easily could be, by being in love with blackboard proofs of existence and with meaningless applications of statistical significance, and ignoring history".

course this description of economic methodology is useful to McCloskey to make her case and advance her own position. That makes it a case of rhetorical dualism. McCloskey, while attacking rhetorical dualisms, has generated her own.

The same pattern can be seen in McCloskey's (1998) treatment of economics. Economics is a science. Economics and economists (like anything else) can be good or bad (see 1998: 5)¹³¹⁴. McCloskey has been happy to admit that she finds neo-classical economics persuasive (*passim*); and if she too seeks to persuade (which presumably she must be) it is reasonable to suppose that she would persuade others of the virtue of neo-classicism. Thus, we might expect to find rhetorical dualism in her treatment of economics and economists. Indeed, she refers to "eclectic Keynesians" (14) – it is not clear whether this means all are eclectic or this is a subset of the whole; however, eclectic has been seen as a term of abuse, particularly in the modernist circles to whom she was writing. Eclectic is equated with anarchistic, fuzzy and other terrible adjectives. Further, those (eclectic) Keynesians were "raised on picaresque tales of economic surprise" (14); which marks them as troublesome outsiders. Similarly roguishly, Marxist economics is grouped with spoonbending and acupuncture (161). In fairness, the list from which those are drawn is part of McCloskey's critique of the attitudes (as she sees them) of modernism to theory evaluation. It is, therefore, like much of McCloskey's work, thick with parody. However, to those who miss the parody – and even those who do not – the inclusion of Marxist economics in the list suggests that it lacks authority [rephrase]¹⁵.

Even more striking is the implicit definition of what is economics and therefore of what it is not. In some cases, the dualism is explicit, but benign. McCloskey (1998: 40) claims that "[n]oneconomists find it easier to see the metaphors [within economics] than economists do". The use of the term *noneconomist* is clear enough, but perhaps inoffensive, since an economist could be merely, for example, one who studies economics. More contentious, though, is the claim that economics "will not digest ideas of embodied labour, the history of institutions, the dependence of a particular demander on a particular supplier" (30) or other historical factors. Economics has "seen various projects to make the subject dynamic...[and]...to make it, in a word, diachronic...[but]...these projects have failed to deflect economics from its static purity. Marxism, the German Historical School, Institutionalism new and old, have been trying to graft diachronic limbs on a synchronic tree" (30). The significance of these passages is not in their explicit content, but in their implication that the named groups are not *in* economics; that economics does not include them. Economics is reduced to a smaller group than it actually is. Economics is mainstream economics.

An even stronger example of this implicit definition and demarcation of economics is McCloskey's discussion of why it is that economists believe in the Law of Demand

¹³ Indeed, perhaps previewing her more recent work (McCloskey, forthcoming), McCloskey makes frequent use of those adjectives (see for example, 1998: 4, 107, 169, 184). What the bases for goodness and badness are is unclear; in pragmatist literature, the standards for good and bad are relative and said to shift.

¹⁴ It is not claimed that McCloskey adopts Friedman's exclusionist, monist approach that "[t]here is no such thing as Austrian economics – only good and bad economics" (cited in Dolan, 1976: 4).

¹⁵ McCloskey's example of a story in which "Poland was poor, then it adopted capitalism, then as a result it became rich" (1998: 14) is, if not historically inaccurate, interesting for its selection.

(1998: 25-8). The crucial question here is not whether McCloskey's arguments are reasonable. Indeed, as reasons why anyone would believe a specific proposition, they are persuasive. The question is: do all economists believe in the law of demand; and therefore, if one does not believe in it, is one still an economist? That McCloskey holds that economists do believe the Law of Demand is clear: "Does [evidence against the law of demand] leave uncertain about the Law of Demand? Certainly not. Belief in the Law of Demand is the distinguishing mark of an economist, demarcating her from other social scientist [sic]...Economists believe it ardently" (25). Again, we must be wary of McCloskey's parody and irony. Part of her point is that economists hold on to beliefs more tenaciously than for which they have 'scientific' warrant, as Kuhn and Lakatos in particular argued. However, it remains apparent that not only do economists (according to McCloskey) demarcate themselves as economists by belief in the Law of Demand, but also, McCloskey is following that demarcation. Thus, those who do not believe in the Law of Demand are not economists¹⁶.

Two things can be said immediately: first, this is a strange demarcation line to choose. It is akin to choosing a level of abstraction which generates a dualist distinction, rather than for any other reason. Maybe McCloskey chose it because it seemed uncontentious. However, of course it is contentious, because there are many economists who do not believe in the Law of Demand; for instance, those who hold that Veblen's theory of conspicuous consumption holds widely; those who are generally sceptical of a stable relationship between price and demand; those who hold that the institutional framework facilitating or causing any price change and then any subsequent reaction in terms of demand must be examined, and that there is no guarantee that the reaction will follow the Law. There are others, who find the *ceteris paribus* conditions central to the Law to be irrelevant at best. In short, there are many who would call themselves economists, for whom the Law is false, and who are therefore, according to McCloskey's classification, not economists. And of course, these economists hold views very different to McCloskey's. So whether intentional or not, McCloskey has demarcated between economists and noneconomists in a dualistic₂ way, and in a way that refers to those whose views she shares as economists and others as beyond the pale. That would appear to be rhetorical dualism₂. 9960 (2000)

Of course, these claims must be reconciled with McCloskey's consistent calls for pluralism, (e.g. Hodgson, Mäki and McCloskey 1992; McCloskey, 2003). Indeed, McCloskey (1994) is much more inclusive and explicitly defends the right to exist and be treated fairly of Marxism, for example. It is possible that she changed her mind about, for example, Marxism between the first edition of McCloskey (1998) [i.e. in 1985] and the writing of (1994).

4. Implications

¹⁶ Indeed, McCloskey (2006, private) defines economics as: "The study of humanity in the ordinary business of life. This (with 'humanity' for 'man') is Alfred Marshall's definition. The definition of the field as the study of scarcity I regard as tendentious because it confines economists to Samuelsonian maximization under constraints".

Hopefully the previous sections have established the argument that rhetorical dualism is a common technique in economics. It forms an important part of the conscious and intended, as well as unconscious and unintended, sub-text of economic discourse. I have also tried to argue that rhetorical dualism can be problematic. A common theme of the case studies above has been that rhetorical dualism is likely to hinder pluralism. Mishan's arguments targeted the credibility of growth theorists and painted a strict distinction between growth and anti-growth camps, one which would appear difficult to bridge and to facilitate conversation. Bhaskar's arguments about the position of CR in philosophy, and the later arguments about the openness of systems and the appropriate methods for studying them, have created schisms. In the case of CR methods, only through considerable work by those sympathetic to CR but eager for useful proposals for action, have these divides been bridged. Monetarists and Keynesians each got wrapped up in trying to prove the other wrong, that perhaps fruitful lines of synthesis were missed. Further, the tenor of the debate would mean that the post-battle environment would be difficult for the losers. That has proved to be the case for 'heterodox' theorists.

4.1 Orthodoxists and heterodoxists

Garnett (2005) provides an excellent commentary on the term 'heterodox' and the related debate on 'pluralism'. This section will attempt to translate his account in terms of rhetorical dualism. Colander, Holt and Rosser (2004) claim that what is effectively rhetorical dualism has dominated the orthodox/heterodox relationship for a long time: in both Marx's attack on 'classical economics' and Veblen's (1900) on neo-classical economics (and we could add, Keynes' (1936) attack on 'classical' theory), they claim that "in each case the classification was made by an economist to create a better target for his criticism" (491)¹⁷. Garnett identifies several strands of argument in 'heterodox' circles. Heterodox arguments are usually self-identified, although some who argue for schools of thought reject the heterodox nomenclature. Garnett argues effectively that thought in terms of a heterodoxy is dualist; and that this dualism is a rhetorical strategic response to the perception of orthodox economics as monistic and intolerant.

The basic form of the dualism is straightforward. Substitute orthodox and heterodox for X and Y in figure 1 and that represents the situation quite well. A common feature in all the treatments is that there is a strict split between orthodox and heterodox on some basis. It is usually theoretical but recently it has been increasingly ontological. That will be discussed further below. First, however, we should discuss some subtle differences in the treatments of the orthodox/heterodox dualism in the literature. We can identify four variants on the basic orthodox/heterodox dualism. First, as identified by Davis (forthcoming) and Sent (2003), there is a model of 'half-pluralism'; i.e., heterodox economists firstly identify orthodoxy, as a monolith, then identify heterodoxy, then acknowledge the pluralism amongst the heterodoxy. There may even be dialogue between the heterodox groups. Fundamentally, the different heterodox groups are allowed to co-exist. Second, is a less pluralistic model, wherein orthodoxy and

¹⁷ Colander (2000) also claims that the term neo-classical is over-used, particularly by heterodox economists, to describe current mainstream economics, when, he argues, mainstream economics is not neo-classical.

heterodoxy are identified, then groups within heterodoxy are identified, but where this is merely a temporary stage. The ultimate goal is to create a single heterodox theory but as a synthesis of heterodox strands. This can be associated with work by Sawyer (1989), Sherman (1987) on radical political economy, and Lavoie's attempt to create a post-classical synthesis. Arestis (1992) is a slight variant, in which he attempts to graft other heterodox elements onto (an already broadened) Post Keynesianism; the result would be a Post Keynesianism which would represent the heterodoxy. Dugger's (1989) work is a similar attempt to create radical Institutionalism. Third, a stronger version of Arestis' and Dugger's model, is the approach taken by, for example, Paul Davidson, in which it is argued again that there needs to be a single heterodox approach, but that this should be squarely based on one (usually existing) heterodox perspective. In Davidson's case, that would be a particular Post Keynesian reading of Keynes. The result would be an axiomatic system more general than the orthodox special case. In all three cases, the purpose is clearly to attack the orthodoxy. A fourth case is a conciliatory version of Davidson's argument: that heterodox economists must engage in debate and exchange with the orthodoxy, with the possibility that there might be mutual fruitful exchange of ideas. This fourth position is significant, because often the position taken up by heterodoxers is simply to ignore the orthodoxy, and to regard them as worthless or incapable of reasonable dialogue (see Lee and Keen, 2004; Fleetwood, 2002).

A fifth variant, which has been popular in recent years, has been to advocate a line of distinction along metatheoretical lines. Davis (forthcoming) regards the heterodox alliances developed so far as unhelpful and ad hoc. He argues that a distinction can be identified between orthodox and heterodox such that orthodox economists have three core beliefs: individualism, rationality and equilibrium. Potts (2000) claims that all heterodox theory rejects the ontology of integral space (a field) which is held by orthodoxy. Lawson (1997) argues that heterodoxy can be identified as advocating depth realism and open systems. Dow (2000) similarly argues that heterodox views share a belief in open systems (although the concept may mean different things to different groups!). In spite of their attack on dualism, Colander, et al (2004) admit that there may be an orthodoxy in terms of the methods required to be used (i.e., economic modelling). In all of these accounts, a dualism has been created not at the level of theory, but at a different, essential level.

So far, the dualism has remained in place. The fault line remains firmly in place. It is possible to cross it, but usually for purposes of attack. Garnett (2005), borrowing from Fuller (2000) and Fullbrook (2001), argues that the work of Kuhn (1962) is responsible for much of this dualism, because of its underlying Cold War thought pattern, which encouraged an 'Us versus Them' outlook, and a tendency to view the other as untouchable and incapable of reasonable dialogue. Thus, Kuhn, who is often associated with promoting tolerance of alternatives, may have been basing his views on a fundamental intolerance of others. Incommensurability is intolerance. Differences between paradigms became extremely hard, and rather than promoting pluralism – in the sense of a tolerance and appreciation of other views and the ability to distinguish between different elements of other views – paradigms weaken it. Instead, the form of pluralism we get is more like that shown in figure 3 above.

It has been shown that dualism is rife in the orthodox-heterodox distinction, and not just on the side of the orthodoxists. It is also clear that this dualism is rhetorical: dualisms are created in order to attack the orthodoxy more effectively, to instil a combative force in participants, to argue that the orthodoxy are incapable of open debate, or to encourage the formation of anti-orthodox alliances. It can also be argued that this dualism is unjustified. A simple heterodox/orthodox dual is flawed because it ignores the diversity on both sides of the divide. Colander, *et al* (2004), who discuss the fragmentation of orthodoxy, claim that the term orthodoxy is backward-looking, and is largely unrelated to the current state of mainstream economics, much of which may be ripe for potentially fruitful dialogue. Dualism is also potentially self-destructive in that it discourages open-mindedness (except to other heterodox views and perhaps view from outside economics), encourages defensiveness (Rutherford, 2000), can perpetuate isolation (Potts, 2000) and negativism. It may also be that the strategy of disengagement with orthodoxy is self-reinforcing; however, it is clear that there are elements and structures of orthodoxy which are aggressively monistic which preclude engagement on equal (or something approaching equal) terms; Colander, *et al* claim that often is those furthest away from new research (and perhaps instead with responsibility for management or undergraduate teaching) who are the most defensive.

Dow's contribution to the debate is particularly helpful. She argues persuasively that the ontological and epistemological grounds for adopting strict dualisms is usually absent. She also argues for a genuine pluralism. However, contra Garnett's (2005) position on Kuhn, Dow argues that a modification of Kuhn is possible which allows a role for schools of thought, but without the intolerance. Her concept of 'structured pluralism' envisages schools of thought as open systems. They have boundaries, but these boundaries are permeable, allowing ideas from elsewhere to affect them. In that way, ideas can even cross the orthodox/heterodox divide (wherever the dividing line is placed) and indeed, no divide is necessary. However, Dow's schema does not collapse into postmodernist eclecticism: there remains structure, both within each school of thought, but across the spectrum of perspectives. Further, it is held that definitions be flexible enough that the fixed pluralism of figure 3 is also avoided.

5. Conclusions

This paper has discussed rhetorical dualism, i.e. the use of dualisms (of various types) for rhetorical purposes. It synthesises elements of Dow and McCloskey's approaches and builds on both and on feminism. The paper formalises the notion of rhetorical dualism implicit in the earlier literature. It has been argued, through brief case studies, that rhetorical dualism is common in economics; this is not surprising, given that it is common in life. Mishan's work on the growth debate, Johnson and Chrystal's commentaries on the debate between Monetarists and Keynesians, Critical Realism, and even McCloskey's treatment of economics are shown to display rhetorical dualism. Crucially, many of the authors attack rhetorical dualism, but fall into its trap.

It has been shown that current uses of the terms orthodox and heterodox, mainly by heterodox economists, also display rhetorical dualism of various types. It is possible to construct a taxonomy of approaches within heterodoxy which are rhetorically dualist in different ways. It is also arguable that heterodox economists may in some way be damaged by the language they are using, either in the perception of themselves that they create.

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