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Game Theory and literary studies:
Aumann's Conjecture and the riddle of the first *Tartuffe*

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Abstract

There are three versions of *Tartuffe*. In the complex affair of Molière's fight for *Tartuffe* (1664-1669), two main speculative problems are involved. The first point to decide is whether there are virtually no differences between the second version and the third version. The second point to decide is whether the first version constituted a complete play or only three acts of an unfinished play in five acts, whether it corresponds roughly to three acts in the final version, and if so, to which acts. This paper sheds a new light on these questions by continuing experimental research on Aumann's conjecture as regards the effectiveness of cheap talk in achieving efficient outcomes in coordination games.

“When Voltaire described Molière as “the painter of France”, he suggested the range of French attitudes found in the plays, and this may explain why the French have developed a proprietary interest in a writer whom they seem to regard in a special sense as their own.”

The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Macropaedia, Volume 24, 2002

1. Introduction

Molière’s work is, to say the least, the biggest common denominator of the French language world. *Tartuffe* is one of Molière’s most popular comedies.

Tartuffe is the drama of a bourgeois household that has lost its harmony and balance through the abdication of the head of the house. It is the story of an attempt, by a wily opportunist (Tartuffe), to destroy the domestic happiness of a citizen (Orgon) who has received him as honoured guest, spiritual guide and moral censor.

There are three versions of *Tartuffe*.

The first version (hereafter *F*) of which not even a quotation has come down to us, was performed on May 12, 1664 at Versailles as part of the magnificent Court festival *Les Plaisirs de l’Ile Enchantée* (7-13 May 1664). It was in three acts. The principal character, Tartuffe, was either a priest or might be mistaken for one. As a result of the pressure from the *dévots*, the play was banned.

The second version (hereafter *P*), put on in Paris on August 5, 1667 as *Panulphe ou l’Imposteur* met the same fate. It lived only one evening. It was in five acts. The *Lettre sur la comédie de l’Imposteur* affords us the sole account of this second version of *Tartuffe*.

The third version (hereafter *T*) is a five-act play. It is *Tartuffe* in the form we know it today. The *première* of this play took place at the Palais-Royal on February 5, 1669.

In this complex affair of Molière’s fight for *Tartuffe* (1664-1669) two main speculative problems are involved.

The first point to decide is whether there are no differences between *P* and *T*.

The second point to decide is whether *F* constituted a complete play or only three acts of an unfinished play in five acts, whether *F* corresponds roughly to three acts in *T*, and if so, to which acts.

The present paper sheds a new light on this twofold problem, which constitute one of the most fascinating in French literature, by using *T* as natural tests of Aumann’s conjecture as regards the effectiveness of cheap talk in achieving efficient outcomes in coordination games.

Cheap talk refers to “costless, non-binding, non-verifiable communication” (Farrell, 1988, p.226) that may take place between agents before the start of a game.

Aumann (1990, p.203) conjectures that “a non-binding agreement can affect the outcome of a game only if it conveys information about what the players will do”.

The present paper weaves together three strands of previous research.

One strand (Brams 1994) combines game theory and literature. Brams (*ibid.*) surveys studies that bring game theory and literature together. He shows that fiction has proved a fertile ground for humanistic applications of game theory. He notes that fiction writers vary in the intuitive understanding of game theory that they bring to their works. He provides a chronological listing of twenty-two literary works (novels, short stories, plays, opera librettos, narrative poems) to which game theory has been applied. In this list, at the top of which there is Conan Doyle’s story *The Final Problem* studied by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), there are six of Shakespeare’s greatest tragedies (*Merchant of Venice*, *Othello*, *Measure for Measure*, *Henry V*, *Hamlet*, and *Richard III*), but here is no trace of Molière’s comedies. Our study marks substantive efforts to close this gap by focusing on *Tartuffe*.

Another strand (Harrison and List, 2004) recognizes that some events that naturally occur in the field happen to have some of the characteristics of a field experiment. We continue this research by examining the relevance of the game-theoretic approach in Molière’s *Tartuffe*. Molière is a timeless author in the sense that his art, owing to its clarity and its concern with human fundamentals, is readily enjoyed by readers and audiences more than three centuries after his death. In *Tartuffe*, characters face well-defined strategic decision problems. *Tartuffe* copies singularities of nature. Every character is real, and every situation is true. The essential quality of truth is to be simple. In *Tartuffe*, Molière has made something more real than life: he has simplified. He has reduced to their simplest forms the wheels within the wheels that surround Dorine, the chief inspector in charge of the investigation.

The third stand (Greif 2002) brings game theory and historical facts together. Greif (*ibid.*) presents studies in economic history that either utilize game theory as their main analytical framework or examine the empirical relevance of game-theoretical insights. He shows that history is another laboratory in which to examine the relevance of game theory. History illuminates game theory and tests it. History supplies “factual grist for the game theorist’s mill” (McCloskey, 1976, p.450). It provides a set of evidence to evaluate game theory. It contains unique and, at times, detailed information regarding behaviour in strategic situations. We continue this research by focusing on *Tartuffe* that presents images of daily life in the seventeenth century. *Tartuffe* represents a social type (the “lay director”) that was

especially common round the middle of the seventeenth century. In addition, there lies in the background of T an actual France: it is an absolute monarchy with a Catholic culture and a powerful Church; in it, all social and familial rules, such as the father's ruling function in any household, are plain matters of natural law.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we mention some theoretical issues pertaining to coordination and communication, as well as relevant experimental results. In section 3, we continue experimental research on Aumann's conjecture by studying Act II of T , in which there is a two-person SH game experiment without preplay communication, and Act IV of T , in which there is a two-person SH game experiment including preplay communication. Section 4 analyzes the differences between P and T , and offers some discussion of the riddle of F . Section 5 presents conclusions.

2. Coordination and communication

“Cheap talk is just that: cheap – neither costly nor binding; and talk – not some roundabout form of communication, like mediation.... In a sense, cheap talk is communication in its purest and simplest form: purest in that there is no direct impact on the payoff, and simplest in that there is no intermediary” (Aumann and Hart, 2003, p.1619). Briefly put, cheap talk is “costless, non-binding, non-verifiable communication” (Farrell, 1988, p. 226).

The effectiveness of cheap talk in achieving efficient outcomes in coordination games, *i.e.*, games that exhibit multiple equilibria, is a subject of controversy that has attracted considerable attention among both theorists and empiricists (excellent overviews of work on coordination are given by Ochs, 1995, Crawford, 1997, and Camerer, 2003; for discussion of cheap talk, see, *e.g.*, Farrell and Rabin, 1996).

From the game-theoretic point of view, Baliga and Morris (2002) briefly review the complete information debate about cheap talk and coordination. They highlight two key ideas. First, following Farrell (1988), a cheap talk statement about your planned behavior is credible if it is *self-committing*: if you expected your cheap talk statement to be believed, you would have an incentive to carry out your plan. Second, following Aumann (1990), a cheap talk statement about your planned behavior is only credible if it is *self-signaling*: you would only want it to be believed if in fact it was true. In other words, Aumann (*ibid.*) conjectures that, if a player has a strict preference over his or her opponent's choice, an announcement that he or she intends to make a particular choice can be met with skepticism.

Experimental economists have documented considerable evidence on behavior in complete information coordination games with communication (*cf.*, *e.g.*, Cooper *et al.*, 1989, 1990, and 1994, Crawford, 1997 and 1998, Charness, 2000, and Clark *et al.*, 2001). All these papers suggest that the extent to which communication can enhance coordination may well vary across different forms of games and messages technologies.

In this connection, Crawford (1998, p.294) “highlights two important determinants of the effects of structured communication in these experiments: whether communication is simultaneous or one-sided; and whether players can achieve a desirable outcome without breaking the symmetry of their roles”.

On the one hand, when a desirable outcome requires symmetry-breaking (as an example, consider the “battle of the sexes” [hereafter, BOS] game), one-sided communication works well because it points to a single equilibrium; two-sided communication does not help because it creates as much conflict as no communication.

In the experimental research (see, *e.g.*, Cooper *et al.*, 1989) on the role of non-binding pre-play communication in a one-shot symmetric BOS game, communication represents simple message about actions, and two possibilities are considered. First, one player is allowed to send one cheap talk message: he can indicate which action he plans to play. Second, the two players are allowed to send these messages to each other simultaneously.

Results are striking: “If a little (one-way) communication helps a lot, two-way communication must do even better, right? Wrong” (Camerer, 2003, p.356). Without communication, the symmetry of the mixed-strategy equilibrium makes it a natural outcome of the game. The existence of potential gains from coordination is clear. With communication, allowing one-way communication is the most efficient way of achieving pure strategy equilibrium. When both players send one round of messages simultaneously, there is chance of confusion that does not arise when only one player communicates. However, multiple rounds of two-way communication are more helpful than single rounds.

On the other hand, when a signal pooling problem critically impairs the credibility of a message (as an example, consider the “stag hunt” [hereafter, SH] game), the effects of cheap talk are opposite: two-sided communication is much more effective than one-sided communication because it provides enough assurance and points to a consistent outcome.

In the experimental research on the role of non-binding pre-play communication in two-person SH games, communication appears to play an important *reassurance* role, allowing subjects to coordinate on more efficient equilibria by reducing their uncertainty

about each other's decisions (Clark *et al.*, 2001). Reassurance is best accomplished *via* two-sided communication (Cooper *et al.*, 1990 and 1994).

In addition, two points are noteworthy.

First, the effectiveness of communication is sensitive to the structure of payoffs: when there are positive spillovers, it is not clear which outcome should be expected. In this case, two types of coordination failures can arise. First, players may unilaterally take actions that lead to a Pareto-inferior Nash equilibrium being played. Second, a fundamental kind of coordination failure can arise if a pure strategy equilibrium is not attained.

Second, the experimental study of "0 sided" communication (Van Huyck *et al.*, 1992), in which subjects are not allowed to communicate but are given by a referee a public, nonbinding suggestion about which equilibrium to play (an assignment to each player of a strategy that is a unique best response for him when the others use the strategies assigned to them) suggests that the credibility of an assignment depends on the strategic details of the game: an assignment to the payoff-dominant equilibrium is credible; on the other hand, payoff-dominated equilibrium points are not credible assignments.

Tartuffe confirms experimental evidence suggesting that communicating with other players increases the likelihood of achieving an efficient outcome in a two-person SH game.

3. The third Tartuffe as natural tests of Aumann's conjecture

In *T*, Molière stages a communal effort in which each character contributes his own tricks to the unmasking of Tartuffe.

Five subjects want to open Orgon's eyes: Cléante, Orgon's brother-in-law; Damis, Orgon's son, Elmire's stepson; Dorine, Mariane's lady's maid; Elmire, Orgon's wife; Mariane, Orgon's daughter, Elmire's stepdaughter, in love with Valère. They want to prove Tartuffe's duplicity to Orgon.

Cléante, Damis, and Mariane are not well developed intellectually characters. Dorine and Elmire display independent and intelligent characters. They are both bold-spirited. Dorine is the head of the team. While being a servant, she is far superior to the other members of the team in any contest of wits. She fully participates in all the team's goals and efforts. She sees through all pretenses.

Building on these facts, it is possible to provide quotes from *T* to give credibility to the following: in *T*, there are two two-person SH games; one is in Act II, the other is in Act IV.

In Act II, Dorine and Mariane participate in a two-person SH game without preplay communication, the normal-form of which is shown in Table 1.

		Mariane (Mariane)	
		R	N
Dorine (Elmire)	R	$x + m - c, x + m - c$	$-c, x,$
	N	$x, -c$	$0,0$

Table 1 (Parenthetical names pertain to the SH game played in Act IV)

In this game, each player has two moves to choose between: to resist (R) or not resist (N). Not resisting is the choice of saying nothing, while resisting involves uttering dissenting words.

The values, although arbitrary, present the situation reasonably. There is a cost c , $c \geq 0$, of resisting. In addition, there are two key points. First, there are strategic complementarities: each player receives a return m , $m > c > 0$, on her investment only if both resist. Second, there is a spillover x , $x > 0$, that one player receives if the other player resists, independent of whether the first player resists.

Both Dorine and Mariane wish to disabuse Orgon. If both resist, they get the outcome that is best for each: Orgon is disabused. If both play N, they don't get anywhere. If one decides not to resist, they don't disabuse Orgon. If Dorine (respectively Mariane) doesn't resist, it is even better for her if Mariane (respectively Dorine) resists, for she avoids being a target for Orgon. The worst outcome for Dorine (respectively Mariane) is if she resists and Mariane (respectively Dorine) does not resist.

This game is symmetric: the column player's payoff matrix is the transpose of the row player's payoff matrix; each of the two players faces the same problems of strategic choice.

This game has two pure-strategy equilibria: (R,R) and (N,N) . (R,R) is Pareto dominant: it is better for everyone than (N,N) . This game has a third equilibrium: a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in which strategy $i = R,N$ is played with probability p_i where $p_R = c/m$ and $p_N = (m - c)/m$. In this third equilibrium, the players behave in a random and uncoordinated manner, which neither player can unilaterally improve on. Each player gets the same expected payoff, xc/m , from going either way.

In Act II, Scene 2, Orgon tells Marianne that she must marry Tartuffe. Dorine plays R, and Mariane plays N. Dorine speaks to her master as a headstrong daughter might while Mariane remains silent.

In Act II, Scene 3, Dorine herself offers a key interpretation of this scene when she says sarcastically to Marianne¹:

DORINE (*Returning:*)

Well, have you lost your tongue, girl? Must I play
Your part, and say the lines you ought to say?
Faced with a fate so hideous and absurd,
Can you not utter one dissenting word?

MARIANE

What good would it do? A father's power is great.

Thus, Act II of *T* confirms that, in a two-person SH game without preplay communication, a fundamental kind of coordination failure can arise: Dorine plays R, and Mariane plays N.

In Act IV, Elmire, and Mariane participate in a two-person SH game preceded by one round of “0 sided” communication, in which they are given by Dorine a public, nonbinding suggestion about which equilibrium to play.

In Act IV, Scene 2, Elmire, and Marianne are actually present on the stage when Dorine says to Dorante:

DORINE

Stay, Sir, and help Mariane, for Heaven's sake!
She's suffering so, I fear her heart will break.
Her father's plan to marry her off tonight
Has put the poor child in a desperate plight.
I hear him coming. Let's stand together, now,
And see if we can't change his mind, somehow,
About this match we all deplore and fear.

In Act IV, Scene 3, Orgon tells Mariane that she must marry Tartuffe, and “mortify her flesh”.

In this scene, Dorine and Dorante are pushed out of the game by Orgon:

DORINE

But why ...?

¹ All quotations of *Tartuffe* are from “Jean Baptiste Poquelin de Molière: The Misanthrope and Tartuffe”, translated into English verse and introduced by Richard Wilbur, First Harvest edition 1965.

ORGON

Be still, there. Speak when you're spoken to.
Not one more bit of impudence out of you.

CLÉANTE

If I may offer a word of counsel here ...

ORGON

Brother, in counselling you have no peer;
All your advice is forceful, sound, and clever;
I don't propose to follow it however.

Then, following Dorine's nonbinding suggestion ("Let's stand together, now"), Elmire and Marianne unilaterally take actions that lead to the Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium being played. They both play R.

Mariane says to Orgon:

Spare me at least-I beg you, I implore-
The pain of wedding one whom I abhor;
And do not, by a heartless use of force,
Drive me to contemplate some desperate course.

...

Spare me, I beg you; and let me end the tale
Of my sad days behind a convent veil.

Elmire proposes Orgon an ambush which amounts to a controlled experiment upon the piety of Tartuffe:

ELMIRE

You've been too long deceived,
And I'm quite tired of being disbelieved.
Come now: let's put my statement to the test,
And you shall see the truth made manifest.

ORGON

I'll take that challenge. Now do your uttermost.
We'll see how you make good your empty boast.

Thus Act IV of *T* confirms that, in a two-person SH game preceded by one round of "0 sided" communication (in which players are given by a referee a public, nonbinding suggestion about which equilibrium to play), an assignment to a Pareto-dominant equilibrium is a credible assignment. Dorine's nonbinding suggestion, "Let's stand together, now", influences the outcome of the SH game played by Elmire and Mariane.

An animated scene ensues in which Orgon is persuaded to hide under a table. It is the turning point of the play. The pleading of Mariane and the perseverance of Elmire silence Orgon. Next, the experiment upon the piety of Tartuffe made by Elmire opens Orgon's eyes.

Orgon witnesses Tartuffe's attempts to seduce Elmire and hears Tartuffe speak contemptuously of him.

The act is brought to a close on a note of high dramatic attention. By the time Orgon is made to see Tartuffe's duplicity, the latter is in a position to bring about Orgon's material ruin. The whole thing comes so close to a very unhappy ending that Molière uses a *deus ex machina* to arrange the outcome required in a comedy of the day. It takes Louis XIV himself to save the day.

Taking this game-theoretic analysis of *T* as a starting point, it is possible to reexamine the complex affair of Molière's fight for *Tartuffe* (1664-1669).

4. Aumann's conjecture, the first Tartuffe, and Panulphe

In this affair, the first point to decide is whether there are no differences between *P* and *T*.

The text of *P* has been lost but a full description of this second version of *Tartuffe*, the *Lettre sur la comédie de l'Imposteur* (hereafter, *L*), appeared soon after the first and only public performance of *P*, in Paris on August 5, 1667.

Dated August 20, 1667, fourteen days after Lamoignon's ban and nine days after the Archbishop's, *L* is situated at the centre of the protracted controversies surrounding Molière's most notorious play. The relevance and importance of *L* in *Tartuffe*'s history is due to the light it sheds on the evolution, nature and significance of the play. *L* reveals so much about Molière's intentions, and it is so full of praise for Molière's cleverness in character construction, that Molière has often been suspected of being the author. However, Mc Bride (1994) has recently made a compelling case that the author is none other than La Mothe Le Voyer.

A scrutiny of *L* reveals that *P* was a complete five-act play.

It has been commonplace for generations of Moliéristes to repeat that there are no differences between *P* and *T*. For example, Caincross (1956, p. 2) writes: "It is clear that there is no material difference between Panulphe and Tartuffe". Panulphe as well as Tartuffe is a sensual parasitic hypocrite, intent on seducing Elmire and defrauding Damis of his property. *P*'s plot is very similar to that of *T*.

However, from *L*, it appears that there are numerous significant changes in emphasis between *P* and *T* (Mc Bride, 1994). In *P*, Panulphe is clad in the latest fashion of the court marquis whereas, in *T*, Tartuffe is dressed in a quasi-clerical costume. *P* is more diffuse and

less streamlined than *T*. The issue of the marriage between the hypocrite and Mariane looms much larger in *P* than in *T*. In *P*, in Act III, Scene 7, the donation comes first and the exhortation to Elmire at the end. In *T*, the order of Orgon's two decisions is inverted.

In addition to these changes in emphasis, three amendments to the text are noteworthy (*ibid.*, p. 147-149): three family councils are omitted in 1669.

In *P*, in Act I, Scene 2, as well a lengthy discussion about hypocrisy, there is a family council involving Elmire, Mariane, Cléante, and Damis about the marriage of Mariane and Valère, all agreeing to press Orgon on it. In *T*, this discussion is omitted, and Damis alone alludes to the delay in the marriage, asking Cléante to raise it with Orgon.

In *P*, at the end of Act II, Dorine, Elmire, Cléante and Damis speak about the proposed marriage of Mariane to Panulphe. This discussion is omitted in *T*, with a different ending to Act II. In Act III, Scene 1, a brief reference by Dorine to Elmire's intention to sound out Tartuffe on the marriage is the only trace of the 1667 scene to survive in *T*.

In *P*, after Cléante's scene with Panulphe (in Act IV, Scene 1), which opens the act, there is another family council. This scene is replaced in *T* by a very short speech by Dorine to Cléante in which she entreats him to intervene with Orgon on Mariane's behalf, as the marriage to Tartuffe has been arranged for that evening.

From this comparative analysis, it appears that dramatic effects are better prepared for in *T* than in *P*. In *P* as well as in *T*, in Act II, Dorine and Mariane participate in a two-person SH game experiment, and a fundamental kind of coordination failure arises: Dorine plays R, and Mariane plays N. However, whereas in *P* Dorine and Mariane participate in a game experiment including preplay communication (the family council, in Act I, Scene 2), in *T* they participate in a game experiment without preplay communication. In *P*, there is preplay communication and it does not play its *reassurance* role. This point is important for what follows.

The second point to decide is whether *F* constituted a complete play or only three acts of an unfinished play in five acts.

Supporters of the latter conclusion rest their case on the statements of Lagrange (one of the most important members of Molière's troop which he joined in 1659 and in which he worked till his death in 1692), according to whom Molière's troop played in May, 1664, "three acts of Tartuffe which were the first three." The opposite school rests its case largely on Molière's *First Placet* to the King, in which alludes to "this comedy" and not to "three acts of this comedy". In addition, had *F* really been only a fragment, Molière would have had interest in highlighting the fact to point out to his critics their unfairness against an unfinished

work. However inadequate the working data may appear, they seem nevertheless sufficient to conjecture that *F* was complete.

The third problem to be solved is that of the contents of *F*. Did its three acts correspond to any three in the present version and, if so, to which and how closely?

From the entries referred in La Thorillière's *Registre* (for the year 1664-5) to payments in respect of Madame Pernelle and Flipotte, it is possible to conclude that both characters appeared in *F* and, since Flipotte's only entry is in the exposition scene, it may be taken that this scene was in *F*.

Beyond this point, general agreement ceases.

Morf (1922) attempts to prove that the three acts of *F* were the last three of *T*. The chief objection to this theory developed with ingenuity lies in the statements of Lagrange quoted above.

Lancaster (1923) and Michaut (1925), among other scholars, hold that the *F* was the rough equivalent of the first three acts of *Tartuffe*. The chief objection to this theory is that the final curtain, on this reasoning, came at the end of present Act III when *Tartuffe*, having worn down *Elmire*'s resistance to his suit and secured the donation in his favour of *Orgon*'s goods, is urged by *Orgon* to frequent *Elmire* "whatever they may say". Such a final curtain is quite out of keeping with the atmosphere of a "*comédie fort divertissante*."

Cairncross (1956), who reviews the whole question, argues ingeniously that the original three acts corresponded closely to Acts I, II and IV of the definitive text.

On this assumption, Act II of *T* (the *dépit amoureux* between *Mariane* and *Valère*) must have been absent from *F*, and *F* must have ended with the unmasking of the *Tartuffe*.

Cairncross's argument as regards the latter point is based largely on the perfunctory manner in which Act V is tied on Act IV. Without the twin factors of the donation and the cassette, the action would not rebound after *Tartuffe*'s unmasking, because *Tartuffe* could not, as he does in *T*, command these arms with which to hit back at *Orgon*. The supposition that the donation and the cassette were added in *P* is confirmed by the fact that both the passages regarding the donation (at the end of Act II and in act IV, Scene 1) and the cassette (the last lines of the Act IV) could be cut out as they stand without affecting the logical flow of the context.

Cairncross's main argument as regards the former contention is threefold (*ibid.*, p. 37-38). First, *Valère* does not appear in Acts I, III, and IV of *T*, and *Mariane* puts none appearance in Act III of *T*. Second, a large part of Act II of *T* seems lifted straight from *Molière*'s earlier *Dépit Amoureux*. Third, there are, in *T*, a number of indications which show

that, in *F*, Tartuffe was concerned to prevent Damis' marriage and force him into a convent, thereby laying hands on Orgon's fortune.

Using the above game-theoretic study of *T*, it is possible to confirm that this hypothesis is plausible.

In *T* as well as in *P* there is, in Act I, a council of war. In *P*, this council of war violates the Aristotelian law of probability, because it does not play its *reassurance* role in the two-person SH game underlying Act II (*cf.* above). Such a violation does not exist in *F* if Act II of *T* is absent of this first version of *Tartuffe*.

Thus, knowing that Molière lived in a society in which one of the results of the founding of the French Academy, in 1635, was return to the Aristotelian laws, our game – theoretic analysis of *T* confirms that Cairncross's analysis is plausible. By itself, this new indication is not decisive but it makes the cumulative weight of all the indications highlighted by Cairncross more considerable.

5. Conclusion

In the complex affair of Molière's fight for *Tartuffe*, two main speculative problems are involved. The first point to decide is whether there are no differences between *P* and *T*. The second point to decide is whether *F* constituted a complete play or only three acts of an unfinished play in five acts, whether *F* corresponds roughly to three acts in *T*, and if so, to which acts.

In this paper, we have shed a new light on this affair by using *T* as natural tests of Aumann's conjecture.

We have shown that *T* confirms experimental evidence suggesting that communicating with other players increases the likelihood of achieving an efficient outcome in a two-person SH game: Act II of *T* confirms that, in such a game without preplay communication, a fundamental kind of coordination failure can arise; Act IV of *T* confirms that, in a such a game preceded by one round of "0 sided" communication, an assignment to a Pareto-dominant equilibrium is a credible assignment.

Taking these results as a starting point, we have reexamined the riddle of the two first versions of *Tartuffe*.

In this connection, however incomplete our analysis may appear, our result is twofold. First, dramatic effects are better prepared for in *T* than in *P*. Second, Cairncross's conjecture -

F was complete in three acts which are roughly identical with Acts I, III and IV of *T*, and Mariane and Valère did not exist originally – is highly plausible

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