

**12<sup>th</sup> Conference of the AHE:**

**« The Economy of Tomorrow »**

**July 7-9, 2010**

**University of Bordeaux – France**

“Labour institutions and economic status in employment: elements of an extended international comparative framework”

*Preliminary – for comments*

**Key-words:** economic status, status in employment, informal employment, labour institutions, international comparisons.

## *Title*

**“Labour institutions and economic status in employment: elements of an extended international comparative framework”**

## *Introduction: debates on international comparisons of labour institutions*

This article is a contribution to the debate about the international diversity of labour institutions. For Freeman [1998, p. 3]: “The war of models is about labour markets”. The sense of this statement however remains somewhat uncertain. Can it be reduced to the flexibility / rigidity debate? Or on the contrary, is it simply impossible for national patterns to be compared, in the absence of any appropriate standard for evaluation?

In order to conceptualize such diversity at an extended international level, it would seem useful to examine the analytical link between the concepts of economic status and the informal / formal employment. We consider that the comparative analysis of labour institutions should implement an economic-status-in-employment approach if it is to encompass an extended international framework.

The international comparative analysis of labour institutions has long been the subject of research in economics, despite certain main theoretical and methodological differences. An overview of the most frequently used methods can be presented according with the extent of comparisons, the fields of research as well as their complementary use and failures.

The new comparative economics on labour market institutions<sup>1</sup> develop an extensive comparative method based in a large number of country cases. Each one is characterised by the same small number of explicative variables which are usually constructed by benchmarking. Therefore, the effect of institutions on labour market performances is evaluated without considering the national specific employment structures. Considering most of the cross-country, cross-country-panel and juxtaposed micro-panel empirical evidence on the effect of labour laws on informal employment, Kucera et Roncolato [2008] criticizes the

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<sup>1</sup> Strictly, the new comparative economics was introduced by Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer [2003]. Among the series of empirical articles that follow, the “regulation of labor” (Botero et al. [2004]) presents new data on employment, collective relations, and social security laws based on a benchmark approach. For a critique of this data see Kirat [2007] and Lee et Torm [2008].

implicit or explicit<sup>2</sup> (Maloney [2004]) analogy expressed by these studies between informal sector in developing countries and voluntary small business in developed countries. Another relevant question is how to represent our understanding of labour laws. In practice rules of laws relevant for workers, that is by altering their behaviour and by the way that they are applied by courts, may have recourse to other registers of law. For example, in the case of common law countries, the ‘unfair dismissal’ is widely controlled as regard as civic rights laws (Serverin et al. [2008]).

The industrial relations (IR) field<sup>3</sup> is characterized as regard as its international perspective by contrasting intensive studies of some country cases, most of them concerning capitalist high-income economies<sup>4</sup>. In accordance with Theret’s methodological remarks [1997], intensive cases are those that need to mobilize the full-context in which the research object is historically embedded. Consequently, any identification of the common character of different cases is specified. However, these country cases are partially assigned by institutional comparative analysis, such as the variety of Capitalism (VoC) (Hall et al. [2001]) to illustrate their ideal types. With regard to these one-dimensional typology, Amable [2005] shows that employment models are more complex than those arising from the supposed functional relation between workers (wage-earners) and the firms. Indeed, regarding job protection, the author shows the existence of the flexible model of so-called liberal economies (USA, UK, Ireland, Canada, Australia), where flexibility is clearly inclined to concern the all labour contracts, whereas other OECD countries present reasonably mixed situations. In addition, there is no exact conformity between so-called liberal economies and decentralized negotiation systems.

The VoC analysis re-examined by Amable, producing a multidimensional typology of capitalism models, seems to be restrained at its international extension - 21 OECD countries - by the necessity of coherence with the principles of the comparative method *stricto sensus* (middle-range theories). That is, not to renounce to construct empirical typologies but to be

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<sup>2</sup> Even if the author “do not pretend to provide an exhaustive account of the informality literature but rely heavily on my [his] own accumulated work on Argentina, Brazil and Mexico” [p. 1159], he concludes as follows: “the urban informal microenterprises should be viewed as a part of a voluntary small firm sector similar to those in advanced countries that, due to the laxity of the enforcement of labor and an other codes, is able to choose the optimal degree of participation in formal institutions” [p. 1173].

<sup>3</sup> Ever since the seminal work of Dunlop [1958] introduced the subject of “industrial relations systems”.

<sup>4</sup> IR studies on developing or emerging economies examine standard research objects from this field such as collective bargaining systems, unions, collective capacities of states... (Haagh et al. [2005], Cook [1998], Yoon [2009]).

conscious of the importance of the variables context<sup>5</sup> related to the object study. Hence, the question of the international extension of analysis should be about what is comparable at the relevant abstract level (Théret [1997]).

Accordingly, our starting point is the concept of economic status as defined by the old institutionalism in economics (Commons [1934]). Following Morel [2010], we propose to explore a Commonsian perspective in which the concept of economic status determines the relevant abstract level for international extended comparisons of labour institutions.

Considering the different kinds and nature of transactions involved in the concept of economic status, in this paper, we essentially review the new ILO guidelines intended to measure informal / formal employment (17<sup>th</sup> ICLS<sup>6</sup>ILO [2003], Hussmanns [2004]). Principally, we propose to contrast the concept of economic status in its transactional dimensions, with the ILO criteria of informal employment (type and degree of economic risk, type of authority and characteristics of the production unit).

We also refer to Commons's famous article "American shoemakers, 1648-1895: A sketch of industrial evolution", (Commons [1909]). The "interpretative" scope of this historic example refers to its focus on bargaining transactions on wages and prices, even if other kinds of transactions are also articulated, notably by the emergence of protective organizations.

This paper stresses on the mutually enriching issues derived from these frameworks for putting extended comparative analysis of labour institutions into action.

We conclude with methodological considerations about how such theoretical perspective may guide new empirical evidences about the international diversity of labour institutions.

### ***Economic status and formal / informal employment: the general frameworks***

The economic status (ES) is a fundamental concept in the Common's theory of institutions. Accordingly with the pragmatic mode of inquiry, it was originally conceived regard as its own experience as expert in cases of process of law in the United States, such as arbitration of labour disputes, social policies or collective bargaining processes.

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<sup>5</sup> Empirically, its may corresponds to the institutional complementarities when they are evaluated by factor analysis techniques (Ahlquist et al. [2009]).

<sup>6</sup> International Conference of Labour Statisticians

The analytical power of this theory is still relevant in political economics (Marangos [2006], Th  ret [2001]). Moreover, it can be activated in a flexible way to obtain understanding of contemporary worldwide labour concerns (Morel [2010], MacIntyre et al. [2002]). In this way, economic insecurity which is generally characterized by low wages, precariousness, reduced social security and public services benefits, macroeconomic fluctuations... (Morel [2010]) is explained in terms of institutionalized positions of no-rights for some individuals and reciprocally no-duties for others. These positions correspond to the economic status of exposure / liberty. Consequently, the focus for the researches should be on the understanding of economic status instituted for (and by) individuals (*ibid.* [p. 220]).

An economic status is defined as “a social relation consisting of the expectations towards which each party is directing his economic behaviour” (Commons [1934, p. 70]). Each party refers to individuals, or more precisely to transactors who exchange<sup>7</sup> property rights which are not consider as ‘natural’. In that view, the ultimate unit of analysis for institutional economic is not commodities or individuals but transactions between individuals. This unit is a unit of conflicting and mutual dependent interests of ownership, which are expected by the participants to persist in the future (*ibid.* [p. 57]).

Commons distinguishes different kinds of transactions that are functionally interdependent: bargaining, managerial and rationings transactions. The distinction is made according with the negotiational psychology<sup>8</sup> engaged in each kind transaction. So, economic status depends on the position than individuals occupy relative to others in their transactions.

Even if in real life situations the different kinds of transaction are fundamentally inseparables, in analytical terms, its can be distinguishable regard as the *working rules* implied. Working rules designate the institutional context (customs and laws) within which transactions take place.

The new ILO guidelines intended to measure informal / formal employment recognizes the coherence between the measure of employment in the informal sector (15<sup>th</sup> ICLS\ILO [1993a]) and the classification of status in employment (15<sup>th</sup> ICLS\ILO [1993b]).

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<sup>7</sup> Commons insists on the double meaning of word exchange: its physical or technical meaning refers to the transfer and the delivery of commodities and its institutional meaning refers to the legal transfer of ownership. (*ibid.* [p. 60])

<sup>8</sup> Negotiational psychology is a social psychology, related with Dewey’s social psychology, which considers individuals not as biological object of the nature but placed in specific circumstances such as scarcity or abundance of alternatives (*ibid.* [p. 91]).

As remark by Hussmanns [2004, p. 2], a senior statistician of the ILO, “The concept of informal employment is considered to be relevant not only for developing and transitions countries, but also for developed countries, for many of which the concept of informal economy [as defined previously by the 15<sup>th</sup> ICLS] is of limited relevance”.

One of the main new elements resulting from informal employment approach is the evaluation of employees in the formal sector as informal workers if they are in law or in practice not subject to national labour legislations, income taxation or social protection benefits (*ibid.* [p. 224]).

The extension at the worldwide level of the statistical definition of informal employment, suggests that this labour concern can be comparable between countries in spite of its significant variations. Criteria used in this framework bring at the same time the common measure of informal employment and a guide for national statisticians to adapt the resulting nomenclature depending on country-specific context.

The purpose here is to connect the kind of transactions involved in the institutionalization of economic status with the dimensions of the status in employment approach of informality (17<sup>th</sup> ICLS\ILO [2003]). That is to show how the new ILO analytical framework can be interpreted in a Commonsian perspective.

What is noticeable here is that, on one hand the concept of economic status brings a general framework for understanding a global labour concern with its institutional variations and on the other hand the informal employment approach arranges analytical and operational dimensions in order to construct one aggregated or more than one less aggregated measures of the informal employment. However, the following exploration could enrich the interpretation of the comparability / equivalence of statistics which is not only a technical question and which is always present in international comparisons.

### ***Bargaining transactions on price and wages and market extension***

The Resolution concerning the International Classification of Status in Employment (ICSE), adopted by the 15<sup>th</sup> ICLS on 1993, establishes that the first criterion used to define the groups of jobs occupied by individuals is the type and the degree of economic risk. In this framework, particular attention is focused on the difference between workers in paid-employment (employees) and workers in self-employment.

The ICSE-93 classifies as employees all of those workers for whom their basic remuneration established in their explicit or implicit employment contract is not directly dependent upon the revenue of the unit for which they work. Accordingly, self-employed are all those workers for whom their basic remuneration is directly dependent upon the profits derived from the goods and services produced for the market or for their own consumption. In analytical terms, the distinction based on the type of economic risk could imply that employees are basically concerned by wage-bargain and that workers in self-employment are basically concerned by price-bargain. If we also consider the degree of economic risk, that is in a Commonsian perspective the position of individuals in their bargaining transactions on wage and prices, the economic status in employment should not be evaluated regardless the market extension process.

In the early development of industrial relations, the Commons' famous article about the American Shoemakers [1909], focused on how their economic status was altered by market extension. In this "interpenetrative if not typical" (Commons [1909], p. 81) industrial evolution, market extension referred to new destinations for products. Different markets were characterised by different levels of competitive menace<sup>9</sup>. The extension of market was described from the itinerant stage where shoemakers were searching the consumers to the world market stage where they were the most distant from their markets (see the table below). Since market extension was identified as the first factor affecting the shoemaker industrial evolution, the kind of transactions first pointed were the bargaining ones. Bargaining transactions involves buyers and sellers all of whom are consider as legally equals in their positions. If they seem to be treated as economically equal; the negotiational psychology of bargaining transaction is persuasion, if they are treated as economically unequal; the negotiational psychology involved is coercion. This kind of transaction follows what Commons called the principle of scarcity. Bargaining transactions imply "alienation and acquisition of legal ownership in consideration of payment or performance" (*ibid.* [1934, p. 61]). Their unit of measurement is money and its measure the ratio of the alienation of ownership to the acquisition of ownership; that is relative scarcities (*ibid* [1934, p. 66]).

***Shoemaker's bargaining transactions***

Exten market	of	Capital Ownership	Kind of Bargain	Protective organisations
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<sup>9</sup> The competitive menace refers to the extent to which marginal producers can be used by buyers to intimidate sellers in bargaining transactions.

Itinerant 0.	<i>Customer-Employer</i> (Row) Material Household Board and Lodging		<i>Journeyman</i> Hand tools	<b>Wages</b> (truck-payment) <i>Price-bargain</i> and <i>wage-bargain</i> (Customer/Journeyman) are identical	None
Personal Market	<i>Merchant-Master-Journeyman</i> Material Hand tools Home shop			<b>Custom order:</b> <i>Price bargain</i> and <i>wage bargain</i> (Costumer/Merchant) are identical Bargain is made separately for each article before the goods are made	craft guild
Local	<i>Merchant-Master (Retailer)</i> Material Finished stock Short credits Sales shops		<i>Journeyman</i> Hand tools Home shop	<b>Retail market</b> <i>Price-bargain</i> Customer/Retailer  <i>Wage-bargain</i> Master/Journeyman	Retail Merchants' Association
Waterways	<i>Merchant-Master</i> Material Finished stock Long credits Store-room		<i>Journeyman</i> Hand tools Home shop	<b>Wholesale order</b> <i>Two price-bargains:</i> Customer/Retailer Retailer/Merchant  <i>Wage-bargain</i> Merchant/ Journeyman	Master's society Journeymen's society
Hightways	<i>Merchant-Capitalist</i> Material Finished stock Bank credits Warehouse Manufactory (inside shop)	<i>Master-Contractor</i> Work shop (outside shop)	<i>Journeyman</i> Hand tools	<b>Wholesale speculative</b> <i>Three price-bargains:</i> Customer/Retailer Retailer/Merchant-Capitalist Merchant-Capitalist/Contractor  <i>Wage bargain</i> Contractor/ Journeyman	Manufacturer's association Employers association Journeymen's society
Rail	<i>Merchant-Capitalist</i> Material Finished stock Bank credits Warehouse Manufactory (inside shop)	<i>Master-Manufacturer</i> Work shop (outside shop)	<i>Journeyman</i> Footpower Machines	<b>Wholesale speculative</b> <i>Three price-bargains:</i> Customer/Retailer Retailer/Merchant-Capitalist Merchant-Capitalist/ Master-Manufacturer  <i>Wage bargain</i> Master-Manufacturer/Journeyman	Manufacturer's Association Employers Association Trade Union
World	<i>Manufacturer</i> Material Stock Credits Power machinery Factory		<i>Labourer</i> None	<b>Factory Order</b> <i>Three price-bargains:</i> Customer/Retailer Retailer/ Merchant-Capitalist Merchant-Capitalist/ Manufacturer  <i>Wage bargain</i> Manufacturer/ Labourer	Manufacturer's Association Employers Association Industrial Union

Based on Commons [1909]

Originally, at the customer order market stage, when the same individual performed the three functions of merchant, master and journeyman, the merchant function summarized the other two. Consequently, the bargain was made between the producer (in its merchant function) and the consumer (neighbours). The price bargain transferred directly production costs to the consumer. Then, Commons related how this position has been modified all over the following stages of the market extension.

He observed that during the first stages there were no main changes in tools of production but only an increase of the expense on circulating capital. Consequently, its increase could only

be compensated by reducing rate pays on each unit of production. Since the power bargaining of purchasers was higher in advanced markets, they imposed higher reduction on prices and wages for shoemakers in relation with distant markets of “future goods” (later made and delivered) than for shoemakers producing for the less intermediated ones (retail market and customer order).

Certainly, a diachronic framework, that is the understanding of historical stages, can't be transposed to differentiate cases of economic status in a synchronic perspective. What we can learn from this example are the main conceptual categories used for evaluate the economic status of individuals: the nature of bargain (price and wage) and the kind of bargain accordingly with the transactional distance to markets.

Recent studies, especially these realized by authors linked with the WIEGO<sup>10</sup> network, on the impact of globalization on employment seems to take into account these dimensions. For example, the insertion of self-employed women in global value chains based on non-traditional agricultural products is linked not only with the capacity to improve processing technologies but also with the access to distant markets, which means that “women still are dependent on middlemen further up the value chain” (Carr and Chen [2001, p. 15]). Their economic status in employment is at least identified as informal because of their weak position on their bargaining transaction on prices. So, contrary to the Maloney's analogical view, this institutional dimension can significantly differentiate the economic status of workers in self-employment jobs between and within developed and developing countries.

### ***Managerial transactions and status in employment***

The second criterion used by ICSE-93 is the type of authority which workers maintain in their employment relation. According with the two criteria referred, the resulting status in employment categories are:

#### **1- Employees**

- Employees with a stable contract including regular employees
- Employees without a stable contract

Self Employed workers:

#### **2- Own-account workers**

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<sup>10</sup> Women in Informal Employment Globalizing and Organizing.

### **3- Employers**

### **4- Contributing family workers**

### **5- Members of producers' cooperatives**

The ICSE-93 also identifies a list of particular groups of workers (casual workers, workers in short-term employment, outworkers, contractors...) most of which may cut across two or more of the main categories. Generally, the difficulty to classify workers by status in employment concerns those in the border line between the categories 1 and 2.

In a Commonsian perspective, the type of authority criterion can be reinterpreted as regard as the position of individuals in managerial transactions. These transactions involve two individuals in a hierarchical production relation. One has the legal right to command, the other must obey. The unit of measurement of managerial transactions is physical productivity (input-output ratio) and its measure relative efficiencies. Is in that perspective that Commons understand the famous statement "Labour is not a commodity": "As a bargainer what the labourer sells is his labour power and the relation is persuasion, coercion or duress. As a labourer he does not sells anything. He obeys orders by delivering his physical output of use value (*ibid* [p 66])."

Consequently, the position of individuals in their managerial transaction depends on the productivity standards that they must obey. However, the problem for economist still is to measure productivity in terms of input-output ratio rather than in terms of outgo-income. That is why in analytical terms, we refer to productivity standards rather than productivity levels.

Productivity standards are frequently identified by reference to the workplace (home-workers, street-workers, domestic workers...) (Unni [2003]). Workplace is also one of the elements characterizing jobs of workers excluded from the scope of certain general labour laws (Daza Perez [2008]). These legal failures or exceptions vary among countries as well as the proportion of workers concerned. In developing countries for which data is available for the 90', home-workers were evaluated in the 90' at 5% (Morocco, Tunisia, Peru, Brazil) to 15 % (India, Kenya, Philippines) of the total employment in non-agricultural activities and in European countries the proportions are similar. Concerning street-workers they are evaluated to represent between 1% and 9% of the total employment in non-agricultural activities depending on the developing country consider (Charmes [2005]).

### ***Rationing transactions, collective bargaining and social dialogue***

The first international official definition of informality was established by 15<sup>th</sup> ICLS (ILO, [1993]). The purposes of the ICLS were to distinguish informal activities from illegal activities, activities related to the “care economy” and informal activities in the agriculture<sup>11</sup> (Charmes [2005]). The main criterion used to define and to measure the informal sector relates to characteristics of the production unit. Informal workers were all of whom during a giving reference period were employed in the informal sector enterprise (ISE).

ISE are household enterprises, that is: “units engaged in the production of goods or services which are not constituted as legal entities independently of the households or household members that own them, and for which no complete set of accounts (including balance sheets of assets and liabilities) are available which would permit a clear distinction of the production activities of the enterprises from the other activities of their owners and the identification of any flows of income and capital between the enterprise and the owners” (15<sup>th</sup> ICLS\ILO [1993a]).

This criterion used to defined informality can be considered as regard as the Commonsian concept of rationing transactions. This kind of transactions implies a legal superior which is a collective superior. Production units if it is legal constituted independently of the households or household members that own them, it can be involved in rationing transactions. That is “negotiations of reaching an agreement among several participants who have authority to apportion the benefits and burdens to members of a joint enterprise” (Commons [1934, p. 68]. What is central is the nature of sovereignty required to be implicated in pleading and argument on the subject of outputs or prices. Commons gave the example of collective bargaining agreements between an association of employers and an association of employees and trade agreements between an association of buyers and an association of sellers.

The “definitional dilemma” of the so called ‘social dialogue’ (Fashoyin, [2004]) could be improved considering the Commonsian analytical framework of institutions. A broader definition of what constitutes the so-called ‘collective bargaining’<sup>12</sup> implies not only a new

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<sup>11</sup> The recommendation to exclude agricultural activities from the scope of informal sector survey, for being measured separately, obeys no to analytical reasons (characteristic of the production units), but to “practical data collection reasons” (Husmanns [2004]).

<sup>12</sup> Collective bargaining is the activity pursuing the conclusion of collective agreements, which according with the ILO Recommendation n°91 [1951] are: “all agreements in writing regarding working conditions and terms of

range of issues concerning terms of employment and working conditions (lifelong learning programmes, gender issues, social protection regimes... ) but also the recognition as rationing transactors of workers who are constituted in new groups and international networks.

## ***Conclusion***

This paper presents an exploration of the international statistical definition of informal employment regard as the main transactional dimensions of the institutional concept of economic status. These dimensions can be used to interpret the scope of one single measure of informal employment in order to evaluate international diversity of labour institutions. Empirically, the preceding elements argue for a diversification of variables used in international comparisons of labour institutions. This process should be conscious of the non equivalence of international statics.

In that perspective, we are investigating (work in progress), by combining different techniques of factor analysis, a relevant typology of developed and developing countries regard as their labour institutions<sup>13</sup>. We present in annex (I) a table with selected variables which are organized in three groups taking into account:

- Labour force structures and productivity standards
- Institutionalization of weak / secured positions in bargaining transaction on labour incomes (in the broader sense of the term)
- Institutionalization of weak / secured positions in rationing transactions.

To conclude, further explorations are required in order to identify a theoretically consistent typology of developed and developing countries regard as their labour institutions.

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employment concluded between an employer, a group of employers or one or more employers' organisations, on the one hand, and one or more representative workers' organisations, or, in the absence of such organisations, the representatives of the workers duly elected and authorised by them in accordance with national laws and regulations, on the other" (quoted by Gernigon et al [2000]).

<sup>13</sup> Labour institutions is one of the seven 'institutional forms' (with Competition regimes, Social protection, Bank and finance, Education systems, Agriculture, Environment) composing the diversity of socio-economic studied in the context of the ICaTSEM project (Institutional Change and Trajectories of Socio-Economic Models). We consider all countries in the world except the smallest ones (less than 1 million inhabitants).

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### ***Annex (I): Data***

<b>Indicators</b>	<b>Variables descriptions</b>	<b>Databases and other sources of data</b>
<b><i>Labour force structures and productivity standards</i></b>		
<b>Economically active population</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Labour force participation rate</li> <li>- Labour force participation of less than 25 years old population to labour force participation of 25-54 years population ratio</li> <li>- Labour force participation of female to labour force participation of male</li> </ul>	<i>Keys Indicators of labour market 6th edition, ILO</i>
<b>Employment</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Employment-to-population ratio</li> <li>- Employment-to-population ratio of less than 25 years old population to employment-to-population ratio of 25+ years population ratio</li> <li>- Employment-to-population ratio of female to employment-to-population ratio of male ratio</li> </ul>	<i>Keys Indicators of labour market 6th edition, ILO</i>
<b>Child Labour</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Economically active children as percentage of ages 7 to 14 and/or children out of school at primary level</li> <li>- Proportion of the population for which children are source of income</li> <li>- Measures to reduce child labour or introduce child labour safeguard</li> </ul>	<i>World Development Indicators, 2007, UNDP</i>  <i>Profils Institutionnels, CEPPI et AFD</i>
<b>Employment in the informal sector</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Employment in the informal sector as percentage of total employment (Multiple methods)</li> <li>- Female share in total employment</li> </ul>	<i>Keys Indicators of labour market 6th edition, ILO</i>

	<p>in the informal sector</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Informal labour market</li> </ul>	<i>Profils Institutionnels, CEPII et AFD</i>
<b>Statuts in employment</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Wage and salaried workers in working population (Multiple methods,</li> <li>- Share of vulnerable employment (own-account workers and contributing family members when available) in total employment</li> <li>- Labour market segmentation by ethnic group and religion</li> <li>- Labour market segmentation by gender</li> </ul>	<p><i>Keys Indicators of labour market 6th edition, ILO</i></p> <p><i>Profils Institutionnels, CEPII et AFD</i></p>
<b>Working time</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Share of workers working more than 48 hours a week</li> <li>- Working time laws</li> <li>- Rigidity of hours index</li> </ul>	<p><i>Keys Indicators of labour market 6th edition, ILO</i></p> <p><i>Data base of conditions of Works and Employment Laws, ILO.</i></p> <p><i>Doing Business, WB and IFC</i></p>
<b><i>Employment and income security</i></b>		
<b>Working poor</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Share of working poor in working population at the 1.25 USD level</li> <li>- Share of working poor in working population at the 2.5 USD level</li> <li>- In-work poverty for OECD countries</li> </ul>	<p><i>Keys Indicators of labour market 6th edition, ILO</i></p> <p><i>OECD</i></p>
<b>Minimum wage</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Minimum wage normalized on GDP (PPP) per capita (2002-2004)</li> <li>- Minimum wage laws</li> <li>- Minimum wage (coverage)</li> </ul>	<p><i>Saget (2008)<sup>i</sup> and ILO(2008)<sup>ii</sup></i></p> <p><i>Database of conditions of Works and Employment Laws, ILO.</i></p> <p><i>Profils Institutionnels, CEPII et AFD</i></p>
<b>Security of contracts</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Difficulty of hiring index</li> <li>- Redundancy cost index</li> <li>- Open-ended contracts as share of total employment contracts</li> <li>- Protection against mass redundancy</li> <li>- Protection against individual dismissal</li> <li>- Dismissal procedures</li> </ul>	<p><i>Doing Business, WB and IFC</i></p> <p><i>Profils Institutionnels, CEPII et AFD</i></p>



<b>Labour conflicts</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Rate of days not worked due to strikes and lockouts</li> <li>- Strikes in the public sector</li> <li>- Strikes the private sector</li> <li>- Functioning of social dialogue within firms</li> <li>- Functioning of social dialogue at national level</li> </ul>	<p><i>LABOSTA, ILO</i></p> <p><i>Profils Institutionnels, CEPII et AFD</i></p>
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*The author, work in progress (ICATSEM, WP2)*

<sup>i</sup> Saget C. (2008), «Fixation du salaire minimum dans les pays en développement : carences et remèdes», *Revue Internationale du Travail*, vol. 147 (1), pp. 27- 45.

<sup>ii</sup> ILO (2008), “Global Wage Report 2008/09: Minimum wages and collective bargaining: Towards policy coherence”, Unit Conditions of work, ILO. (statistical appendix)  
[http://www.ilo.org/global/What\\_we\\_do/Publications/lang--en/docName--WCMS\\_100786/index.htm](http://www.ilo.org/global/What_we_do/Publications/lang--en/docName--WCMS_100786/index.htm)

<sup>iii</sup> Weil, D. (2008), «Pour une approche stratégique en matière d’inspection du travail», *Revue Internationale du Travail*, vol. 147(4), pp. 379-410.

<sup>iv</sup> Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations

<sup>v</sup> Bazillier, R. (2007), *Normes fondamentales du travail et développement économique*, thèse de doctorat, Université de Paris I – Panthéon Sorbonne.  
[http://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/25/82/30/PDF/Bazillier\\_remi\\_these.pdf](http://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/25/82/30/PDF/Bazillier_remi_these.pdf)

<sup>vi</sup> Lawrence S. and Ishikawa J. (2005), “Social Dialogue Indicators: Trade Union Membership and Collective Bargaining Coverage, Statistical Concepts, Methods and Findings”, Policy Integration and Statistic Department, ILO, Working Paper n°59.// (statistical appendix)  
[http://www.ilo.org/integration/resources/papers/lang--en/docName--WCMS\\_079175/index.htm](http://www.ilo.org/integration/resources/papers/lang--en/docName--WCMS_079175/index.htm)