

## WIDENING THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HATRED

### 1. Introduction

Besides offering intellectual challenges, the area of hate is an important one for policy. In recent times, hate crime laws have been passed to deal with specific issues like terrorism, animal rights activism, religion, ethnicity and there are frequently new proposals for specific protection measures. Police forces have also been directed into paying attention to hate crimes defined over domestic violence, homophobia and racism. Legislation and information campaigns have been prominent, in recent decades in the UK, to 'kick racism out of football' [see Frosdick and Marsh (2005)]. In the workplace, and in the schoolyard, bullying and harassment are now receiving more attention than ever before. Recently (May 2007) moral media panic broke out over a specific case of racist school bullying and led to the offering of statistical evidence that this was a rapidly growing problem.

One can question the efficiency of an *ad hoc* evolution of anti-hate laws. For one thing, such offences are in fact usually covered by existing laws. One could be cynical and claim that many of the hate laws and anti-hate policies are a covert means of extending surveillance of all citizens.

Given the increasing relevance of hate in the modern world to policy it is vital to have a logical analytical framework. Rational choice economics of the neo-classical variety offers such a framework. Heterodox, and more radical economists, are critical of the relevance of this to choice in topics of a much narrower range than that discussed

here. They are thus likely to be extremely sceptical of an 'economics of hate'. Such an approach has been offered in an article by Glaeser (2005) in a leading mainstream economics journal. This is an attempt to explain some historical episodes or group hatred in terms of entrepreneurial behaviour- the likes of Hitler and Ku Klux Klan leaders manipulating information to induce support. The present paper addresses the need for something at the individual choice level of such a model that does more than just treat the taste for hatred as another consumer good like ice cream or Beethoven cds. The status of hate as an emotion is evaluated. This necessitates engaging with the burgeoning literature on the economics of the emotions which is again largely mainstream neoclassical economics.

An alternative approach is proposed which is situated within a 'modular matrix of hatred' that draws on work, in more psychological areas, and relates hatred to the development of obsession and the capacity of an individual to 'project' emotions on to objects and thereby engage in reification. This will be applied to the issue of the role of self hatred as foundation for generalised hatred.

## **2. The Rational Choice Approach to Hatred.**

We can see the rational choice approach as covering the consumption of hate and the entrepreneurial production of hate. It leads logically to econometric models of how costs influence hate behaviour. This is well demonstrated in work on (political) <sup>1</sup> terrorism, for example Enders et al. (1990, p.85) boldly state:

“We view terrorists as rational actors who attempt to maximize some goal or shared goal, subject to a set of constraints restricting their actions. Alteration in these constraints, as might result when governments augment their efforts to curb certain types of terrorist events, should have predictable effects on the terrorists’ behaviour. (..) Governmental policies to harden targets or increase penalties should induce predictable actions by the terrorists.”

They go on to argue that, as terrorism is a ‘normal good’ then a rise in the resource base of the terrorists or a rise in the cost of substitutes for terrorism will reduce the effectiveness of anti-terror policies. So far we have a nice simple policy conclusion. Even better, Enders et al. provide empirical evidence using the introduction of metal detectors, in U.S. airports, in the first quarter of 1973 on a variety of ‘skyjacking’ measures. They also look at substitution effects into kidnappings and non-skyborne hostage taking. They also look at the impacts of UN General Assembly and UN Security Council resolutions against hostage taking and retaliatory raids against Libya. The results of a standard econometric approach to analyzing data outcomes for these measures are somewhat less than what was hoped for. The conclusion is reached that the use of metal detectors, at airports, did have a deterrent effect but there were significant substitution effects, to other strategies offsetting the net impact. Further, UN resolutions had no effect which is what the standard narrow microeconomic analysis of cheap talk which was not mentioned in this particular study, would lead us to expect. Worst of all the counter-raid on Libya had a counter productive effect bringing more terrorism resulted and this seems to have been a long-run shift rather than a temporary aberration. This latter counter-

productive facet suggests there is a need for an economic approach to hate, and emotions in general that is wider than the 'commodity' approach.

More recently, Jaeger and Paserman (2005) study the dynamics of violence in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict since the outbreak of the Second (or 'Al-Aqsa') Intifada in September 2000, during which more than 3,300 Palestinians and more than 1,000 Israelis have been killed. The conflict has been volatile in the statistical sense as there are periods of high levels of violence and periods of relative calm. In itself, this says nothing whatsoever about the presence or absence of rationality among the chief participants as there may be strategic factors precipitating the level of activity. Using data on the number of deaths occurring each day between September 2000 and January 2005, Jaeger and Paserman estimate reaction functions for both Israelis and Palestinians. They find evidence of unidirectional Granger causality from Palestinian violence to Israeli violence, but not vice versa. Such reaction functions are premised on the assumption that each side maximizes utility subject to conjectures about the actions of the other. They find evidence of unidirectional Granger causality from Palestinian violence to Israeli violence, but not vice versa. In other words the statistics say that Palestinian violence is provoking Israeli counter actions but not the other way round.

Theoretically, hate can be treated as rational in such a context along the lines of the analysis of discrimination in the Becker approach. That is, haters have a 'taste' for hating. Clearly an economic analysis of terrorism could proceed on the grounds that there is no hate at all (in the normally understood) sense of the word –just the use of violence and destruction as a means of contesting resources. A simple model of taste

hate would be premised on perfect information but it is possible to get more out of the rational choice approach by looking at the consequences of imperfect information.

We can begin at the opposite end by asking how you choose to find a 'friend' or an associate. Information about people can be acquired in the same way as for a car or a house. You could enter into pre-commitment search. The cheapest screen is the appearance of the person. This may convey genuine information. For example, if the prospective person is much bigger and stronger than yourself, then you face the risks of domination and injury if the relationship turns sour- for example there is the risk that the other person may come to hate you. On the other hand, such a disparity conveys that the friend or partner may protect one from the threat of others. Appearance may also signify the risk of disease in the form of skin colour or blemishes and missing or disfigured body parts.

Moving into more questionable territory one might draw conclusions from appearance about trustworthiness for e.g. that the person looks like a criminal because of the way their eyes move and so on. It has for a very long time been popular in popular discourse to claim that someone is untrustworthy because their eyes are "too close together". In the same vein, apart from sheer disutility itself, the fact that a person smells unpleasant may be a low cost way of inferring that they are likely to infect one with a disease or pest.

However much one may not like the idea that people use these kinds of cues, they can be a consistent part of rational choice economic explanations of association between people. What we have just described is an application of the Arrow-Phelps model of 'statistical discrimination' which was applied to the labour market. There the

choice is over finding the most productive employee from a group of options whose productivity can not readily be discerned without considerable search and assessment costs. A 'rule of thumb' satisfying heuristic such as 'always choose white males unless there is a shortage' would not be considered as hateful as it has no intent content i.e. the individual derives no utility as such from rejecting the groups who fall outside the heuristic.

Risk, uncertainty, transactions costs, and lack of information can be made to provide a rationale for the emergence of something approaching nearer to hate from rational choice grounds rather than simply being a taste. The Glaeser (2005) approach discussed in the next chapter is basically an extrapolation of this point into collective supply behaviour by 'hate firms'. The essential point is that information is costly meaning that we may not seek to fully explore the 'true' nature of those we have negative views towards. Comparing people with cars, there is less incentive to test drive a car than another person especially if the supply of people is fairly elastic. Thus we have plenty of other people to pick from instead without resorting to anyone from a group with a negative trait.

So, information costs open up the scope for hate entrepreneurs who can seek to deliberately manipulate information in order to increase the output of their particular type of hate. This type of concept of entrepreneurship is prevalent well outside the economics literature. For example Tilly (2003, p.24) says "Like their economic counterparts, political entrepreneurs engage in various forms of brokerage : creating new connections between previously unconnected social sites. But they do more than link sites. They specialize in activation, connection, coordination and representation." Chua (2003.p.187)

refers to Rwanda's Hutu Power leaders who "opportunistically whip up mass hatred against the resented minority"

Traditional rational choice neo-classical microeconomics of hate can work off a basis of utility maximization and entrepreneurship without delving into the deeper psychology of the matter but extending this into policy would seem to run into problems if we take the standard welfare economics approach. It might then seem that hate would never be Pareto optimal as the object of the hate must be worse off. This has to be qualified by the instance of 'sado-masochistic' game structures where being hated is enjoyed. Sado-masochism is normally used to denote the enjoyment of suffering in the abstract—either giving it or receiving it. That is, it may not be necessary for hate, as such, to be involved, in order for sado-masochistic pleasure to be derived. In economic terms, sadists and masochists must be receiving utility from the pain exchange or they would not have chosen to enter into it. Clearly, one could conceive of a similar situation with regards to hate in the wider sense. That is, a pair of individuals could enjoy hating each other and so there would be Pareto optimal hate exchanges. If there were a number of such pairs in an economy then an efficient general equilibrium system would optimally match them with each other. One clichéd example of this is the love-hate marriage, depicted for example in the Hollywood movie 'War of the Roses' starring Michael Douglas and Kathleen Turner. In such set ups the individuals try to separate because they hate each other but find themselves reconvening because they get greater net benefits from being in the conflictual relationship. They 'love' the hating too much to stop.<sup>2</sup>

Imperfect information may make it easier to bring ‘hate-like’ behaviour into an economic model although it does not fundamentally alter the perspective of hate being a normal good which underlies policy conclusions. The gist of the econometrics of terrorism papers discussed above is that if the price of hate goes up then the quantity of hate should go down *ceteris paribus*. Two very elementary wrinkles have to be added to this. One is that if hate is a commodity and is a Giffen good, then hate demand would be decreasing in income and would have an upward sloping demand curve. This has a bad side and a good side. Increasing sanctions would, in this case, lead to more hate. Conversely we have the optimistic ‘civilization’ view that rising incomes will lead to a decrease in hate. I am not here taking the symmetrical view that love would then have to be a ‘normal’ good as it is equivalent to a positive quantity of an emotion of which hate is a negative quantity. This kind of approach was taken by Boulding (1962), in a pioneering and enterprising study of conflict. One suspects this was for pragmatic diagram drawing reasons as no particular justification was given.

The other wrinkle is non-monotonic supply of hate curves. This would again produce perverse sanction effects. These are all very nice logical ideas which might be drawn upon to justify the application of mainstream economic theory although there realism is questionable and thus they may simply be used to impede inquiry into more productive interdisciplinary approaches to some phenomena.

### **3. Choice, Emotions and Hatred.**

In the previous section, hater was treated as a good or commodity on a par with raspberry jam or hamburgers. We should pause to note that, outside economics; other scholars [e.g. Douglas and Isherwood (1979)] see the consumption of even every day



commodities not as something “simple” but deeply imbued with meaning. In the terminology of Leibenstein [1953]’s pioneering analysis of bandwagon, Veblen and snob effects there may be few genuinely “functional” items of consumption. That is, those that satisfy a `basic physiological need without additional social elements being involved. One can readily see this issue with respect to hate. For example would Adolf Hitler have happily eaten a Jewish apple pie?, and reversing the situation- how many of us would consume an exhibition of his paintings in the same way we would if it was by an anonymous Sunday painter? A related argument has long been made about the music of Wagner.

The dominant factor in the non-functional consumption example just given is the presence of a symbolic content to the consumption act which is mediated by thought and emotion. If we are to fit hate into economic analysis in anything other than a prosaically mechanical way, then we have to treat it as an emotion. The issue of emotions, in mainstream economics, has tended to be dismissed in favour of the reduction of all experiences to a single metric of utility even if most economists are not prepared to go so far as saying that there are viable cardinal units of measurement of this concept.

The role of emotions has been highlighted in a recent issue of the world’s premier organ for the dissemination of economic ideas in a broadly intelligible form- the Journal of Economic Perspectives which is the companion journal to the more technical American Economic Review issued by the world’s leading professional body in economics – the American Association of Economics. In it, an academic who is both a Professor of Psychology at Princeton University and Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Pittsburgh, writing in a symposium on cognition, brain science and

economics, Cohen (2005, p.3) says “ Emotions influence our decisions. They do so in just about every walk of our lives, whether we are aware or unaware of it and whether we acknowledge it or not. In particular, ( ..... ) emotions may explain inconsistencies in human behavior and forms of behavior that some have deemed irrational, though such behavior may seem more sensible after a discussion of the functions that emotions serve- or may have served in our evolutionary past”


What kind of emotions are we talking about here? More specifically, where does hate fit in if at all? In general, the writings which explicitly claim to be about emotion, within the economics literature, tend to focus on emotion in a general sense rather than the common categories of emotion such as love, anger, jealousy etc. In this context, a non-specific emotion may attach itself to a piece of data. Take share prices. In the mainstream micro model with risk and uncertainty added, the prospective share dealer should be weighing up the probabilities of different streams of returns in a dispassionate manner. However, if they were to become emotionally attached in the sense of having a commitment to a certain state of belief, then things would be different. Their emotions could introduce biases into their decision-making. An outcome would be favoured because there is an emotional attachment to it or commitment to it which is not based on the objective data.

This kind of perspective on the emotions has had a fugitive existence in macroeconomics. Heterodox macroeconomists, especially those of the ‘Post-Keynesian’ persuasion have been keen to stress the role of ‘animal spirits’ in Keynes original treatment of investment and entrepreneurship. This angle was also heavily emphasized in the works written by Joan Robinson in exposition of the General Theory. GLS Shackle,

in his review of the crises in economics of the 1930s, put very well the problems surrounding Keynes' allowing emotions to penetrate the theory of investment " Keynes in the *General Theory* attempted a rational theory of a field of conduct which by the nature of its terms could be only semi-rational. But other economists gravely upholding a faith in the calculability of human affairs could not bring themselves to acknowledge that this could be his purpose." (Shackle, 1967, p.129)

He goes on to claim that Keynes GT has a dual nature containing both an orthodox economics approach and a more radical one., At this point Shackle makes the more blunt claim that "Investment is an irrational activity or a non-rational one". This is a step beyond his rather vague use of the term 'semi-rational'. It is rather hard here to see what exactly the difference between irrational, semi-rational and non-rational is. However it is plain to see that *some* kind of departure from irrationality is being laid at the door of emotions.

What is the simple nexus of hate and emotion that underpins the most basic idea of hate policy? It can be put in the following form which an economist could see as production relation



A stimulus is an initial piece of information. The ‘to be hated’ person (*hatee*) appears on television or in one’s street or workplace. The thought is the cognitive processing of this experience which triggers the emotion of anger, rage or whatever which may culminate in hate defined as an emotion or hate defined as the specifics of the action at the end of the chain. The extreme form of an action is the violent assault or murder but given how we started this paper, it is plain to see that we are now in a world where the “sticks and stones will hurt my bones but names will never hurt me” chant of the playgrounds of yore does not apply and jokes, verbal abuse and so on are shading into the category of actions. This is explicit in the mainstream idea on harassment at work, for example, that the offence is in the perception of the victim. Thus a thought or emotion when expressed becomes an act if it enters the cognition of the subject who was the inspiration of it (or who is a member of the group that is the inspiration of it).

Table 1 shows a crude classification of mental and emotional states surrounding hate:

<u>Primary and Derived Emotional States</u>	<u>Derived Actions/Mental States</u>
	Aggression
	Paranoia
Bitterness	Victimisation
Revenge	Racism/Sexism
(Intense) Dislike	Homophobia
Obsession	Misogyny/Misandry
Contempt	Xenophobia
Loathing	Religious Hatred /Anti-Semitism
Jealousy/Envy	Assault (includes Rape)
Resentment	Harassment
Spite	Bullying
Hatred	Murder
Anger	Threats (in the limit Death Threat)
Malice	Suicide
Prejudice	Sado-Masochism
	Lesbophobia

TABLE 1: EMOTIONAL AND MENTAL STATES RELATED TO HATE

I have classified hate as an emotion in this table despite the lack of attention paid to it in economic literature on the emotions. However, the table does not come to a decision on whether this is a primary (visceral) or derived emotion. One possibility is to see it as reification of anger, which we come to in a moment via considerations of the appropriation of the concepts of personal and social capital.

#### **4. A Wider Approach.**

A wider approach needs to take into account the true nature of hate and its connection to emotion. However, this may open us up to the risk of particularism in terms of treating each type of hate as unique and not susceptible to any general analysis thereby mirroring the policy malaise in this area. Let us look at the specific case of *Road Rage*. According to Scott (2000, p.2) [n.b. a non-economist] road rage is “quite unlike other forms of interpersonal violence” thus making its interpretation a formidable

challenge for researchers and, by implication, a distinctly problematic area for conflict resolution practitioners.

Why does Scott claim it is unique? The reasons are

- It involves strangers
- It is related to a driving incident
- It hinges upon invasion of personal 'space' and thereby is a challenge to identity

The second of these appears only truistically irrelevant. The others would appear to be common characteristics of many other hate situations. I will here avoid entering into a discussion the formal concept of a stranger as elaborated by Georg Simmel [see Lawrence (1976)]. Terrorists, soccer hooligans and racists burning out homes and shops are attacking strangers unless we argue that the latter are 'significant others' or 'outgroup members' [ see Zizzo (2006)] being despised members of a community rather than 'total' strangers.

So we need a wider approach in the sense of one that does not reduce the whole issue to a case study approach and wider in the sense of going beyond the simple 'hate as a commodity' approach to use ideas from other areas of mainstream economics and ideas from beyond economics . My particular preference is to push for a modular model of hate taking off from Figure 1 and Table 1 into more complex interactions. There are intimations of such an approach throughout the book by Tavis (1982) on Anger which is, perhaps tellingly titled 'Anger: The Misunderstood Emotion'. It is very much pitched

against the ‘let it all hang out’ approach to expressing anger which is in marked contrast to the negative image of hate in society. There would of course be no contradiction, only a paradox, if we took a very simple modular approach of classifying anger as ‘good’ when it is ‘just anger’ and ‘bad’ when it is hate.

To begin the use of a wider approach from a modular perspective we need to look at the psychological foundations of emotions. Economist approaches to emotions (such as discussed by Cohen (2005)) relate to its functionality and thereby tend to regress to sociobiological/evolutionary psychology clichés. As with the literature on ‘emotional intelligence’ [Goleman (1995)] there is an avoidance of the idea that society might degenerate into collective and persistent neurosis although it might be a logical extension of Sen’s idea of ‘rational fools’. Thus, emotional intelligence proponents would argue that anyone who displays self-defeating (non functionally useful) hate is displaying a low level of emotional intelligence even though they may have a high level of traditional mechanical intelligence i.e. the ability to do maths, hold complex arguments etc.

At the centre of the individual’s emotions is the issue of personal identity which in economic terms can be rendered as a form of personal capital. An individual conceives of themselves in a certain role within the web of social relationships. This need not be a flattering role- they may have a self-image of being a loser or an inconsequential



joker. Conversely their self image may be a grossly inflated one delusional one at odds with reality. This may require that they engage in cognitive dissonance as formalised by psychologist Leon Festinger (1957) and later taken on board in the uneasy fringes between mainstream neoclassical economics and a wider approach in the papers of Akerlof and Dickens (1982) and Gilad et al. (1997). In these models the ability to maintain a delusion is fostered by selectively blocking information by avoidance. At some point a shock may exceed the avoidance screen and cause the delusion to collapse. In standard consumer-type situations, the individual will then switch to a re-evaluation of their situation. For example, if it is health information such as a food scare we would find the demand collapsing suddenly rather than gradually declining in a marginal manner.

Here we have an adherence to the core mainstream economic notions of non-neurosis. However, one consequence of a dissonant self-image is the possible appearance of elements of self-hate in an individual's behaviour [ Bushman and Baumeister (1998)] potentially giving rise to projections of the self-hate onto others. Or, we could argue in cases of aggressive suicide [see Cameron (2005)] that the process takes place in reverse-hatred of others is projected onto one's self. Expulsion of extreme emotion, of which hate is the culmination can be a logical response to the dissonance. We might want to characterize it as a disequilibrium state but should be cautious about the idea of it being a short-run disequilibrium as the short-run here may last a very long time.

The idea of the modular module is that a dissonant individual can form myriad connections between the entities in Table 1 with there being no set circuit of movement through them. How the individual processes through the chain may have a random element and it may be conditioned by entrepreneurship. Take the example of race hate

or xenophobia (such as the anti-Americanism expressed in many beleaguered developing nations). An individual may pour their needs for emotional outlet into these forms when they could have taken other forms without this being through any kind of cost-benefit calculation if hate/anger are driving visceral emotions that over-ride such calculus.

This is not to say that we might not have a split model where many individuals behave outside the milieu of conventional consumer theory but do have their feelings amplified by entrepreneurs who act as per the economics textbook.

One possible route to connect individual hate to collective hate, in a wider way than the basic entrepreneurial model of Glaeser (2005) is to make some connection with the burgeoning literature on social capital for an example of which see Schuller (2007)]. Social capital has tended to be invoked in the realm of 'nice' things like community spirit and other support networks rather than 'nasty' things like anger, hate, murder, war murder and terrorism]. The same arguments would apply and would likely follow the kind of symmetrical metrics of Kenneth Boulding which we dismissed earlier –viz. eruptions of bad events would be linked to the shortage of social capital because social capital is seen as a universally good thing.

On the social capital aspect, it might be thought-provoking to give some consideration to the hypothesis that the demand for hate as a recreational commodity seems to be accelerating due to network externalities of sharing. Here are some examples from internet discussion groups

***Cambridge Message Board***

***Celebrity Hate Club – We're All Neighbours***

***Selected Quotations***

*Published by [Jude 1](#) at 11:03am on Thu 20th July 2006.*

*i hate so many "celebrities" i think i may be in danger of dying from all the hate and poison flowing through my veins.*

*Published by [Matt Abysmal](#) at 1:25pm on Thu 20th July 2006.*

*I was going to say that hating celebrities was all a bit pointless, then saw June Sarpong's name up here and grrrrr just thinking about her whining voice makes me reach out for something to smack her about a bit! :o)*

*Published by [swanlike](#) at 9:43pm on Thu 20th July 2006.*

*Graham Norton HATE him! I'd like to jump on he's face while wearing my Toe-Tectors then put his head in a blender.*

*Published by [BooBoo](#) at 1:26pm on Thu 20th July 2006.*

*It is ultimately pointless. But if I didn't hate celebrities I'd hate real people instead and that is so much more dangerous ... ;) I'd attack them with .. oohhh biros or something.*

There are numerous other examples of this kind of thing. No one is suggesting that celebrities, politicians and those temporarily flicked into the limelight should be protected by across the board anti-hate policing, But what if it results in death threats?

A few years ago Swiss football referee Urs Meyer, who retired six months after the campaign launched against him by the Sun newspaper, received 16,000 hate e-mails including death threats. All on account of a decision he made which went against England. In the climate of emotional inflation, death threats seem to becoming part and parcel of everyday life albeit official statistics are not kept of them (in the USA death threats are not recorded in harassment at work data). The protagonists in the 'Big Brother' [UK franchise] case, which erupted in 2007, have had death threats (which were taken seriously by the police) as have others such as a teenage boy who launched a website arguing on behalf of animal using industries and researchers.

It may seem a long way from (supposedly) light-hearted *ad hominem* attacks on celebrities and sports persons to such things as racially motivated murderers. However the underlying issues are fundamentally the same. To wit, the depersonalization of an individual. In a global media driven society many cognitive relationships are not with people but with the perceived images of people. The same process of depersonalization is entailed in becoming a hand-combat soldier or a state-sponsored mass murderer such as an agent of the Holocaust. This is well illustrated in the case of Graham Taylor (former England football manager) in a recent interview on BBC R4 (Sunday breakfast programme February 2007) when he said that he could shrug off the abuse of the 'turnip head' campaign in tabloid newspapers and could also let go the upset to his close relatives but he went on to say that the overwhelming objection was to experiences of being in physical danger from being beaten up by people who now felt legitimated by the hate campaign.

Animal liberationists would of course point out that the mis-treatment of animals comes from their 'non-person' status and we observe through history that hate victim groups are often depicted as animals (being called pigs, having monkey chants made in earshot, being portrayed as smelly) or having unwholesomely close relations (sleeping with them, having them under the kitchen table).

The corollary to advancing reified depersonalization is emotional inflation in rhetoric. Things speed up and traditional animalistic metaphor hatred may not be 'good enough' for the modern hater. The volume of communications drives down the impact value of any act or statement and thus these have to be louder. From an economic point of view we could also point out that if hateful acts bring utility which is diminished by socio-technological changes then the individual may feel the need to step up their hatred investments in order to maintain an addictive emotional equilibrium.

## **5. Conclusion.**

The implication of the statement of the idea of emotional inflation is that there will be an over-supply of hate at various points prior in the nexus to action itself. Clearly if intervention is to fuel feedback loops within this nexus it may contribute to an over-supply at the end point itself. The more types of offence we have the more risk we have of regulation fuelling the hate expressions as it contributes to perceptions of favouritism towards those with the latest bundle of protection.

If we are to find ourselves treating emotions as crimes then we also face the problem that the production of threatening expressions of emotion can be done at extremely low cost. The principal culprit in this is the e-mail death threat. There is then a potentially huge volume of expressed socially undesirable content to be dealt with.

Footnotes.

1. I attach the word political to flag up the debate about whether such organizations as the Animal Liberation Front are (a) political (b) terrorists . The case being discussed in this paragraph is political terrorism in the conventional sense as it is about conflict over rights of general citizenship.

2. One might want to question whether romantic relationships and sado-masochism are rational and not just manifestations of neuroticism. The arguments about their ‘normality; can be found, for romantic love, in Cameron and Collins(2000), and for masochism in Phillips (1999).

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